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INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: HOW SHOULD A SOVEREIGN 
BANKRUPTCY FRAMEWORK BE STRUCTURED? 
Patrick Bolton* 
DavidA. Skeel, Jr. ** 
lNTRODUCITON 
For at least two decades now, commentators have suggested that 
international policyrnakers should establish a sovereign bankruptcy regime.' 
The reasoning is quite simple. Given that financially distressed sovereign 
debtors face many of the same problems that justify personal and corporate 
bankruptcy, such as the difficulty of coordinating the debtor's widely dispersed 
creditors, why not consider the same kind of solution in the case o:fsovereign 
distress? 
Until quite recently, these proposals were viewed as intriguing, but a bit 
far-fetched. In the past several years, however, everything .has changed. . . . 
Sovereign bankruptcy has suddenly become a front-burner issue in 
international finance. Nothing epitomizes the extent to which sovereign 
bankruptcy has entered mainstream discussion so much as the stance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In recent years, financialIy troubled 
sovereign debtors have come to rely increasingly on IMF loan programs as a 
• John H. Scully '66 Profess"" of Finance and Economics. Princeton University. 
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mechanism for addressing fiscal crisis.' Although originally somewhat 
skeptical, the IMF has become increasingly sympathetic to the sovereign 
bankruptcy concept as the cost of its interventions has dwarfed its resources. 
In 2002, the IMF explicitly endorsed the sovereign bankruptcy concept. The 
IMP is _ the leading institutional proponent of sovereign bankruptcy and 
has developed a detailed proposal for what the Fund calls a "Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism" (SDRM): Sovereign bankruptcy has figured 
prominently in other venues as well, such as the recent meetings of the G-7 and 
G-lO nations. 
The most obvious explanation for the recent interest in sovereign 
bankruptcy is that the crises of the 1990s, such as the bailout of Mexico in 
1995, the Asian crisis in 1997, and the turmoil in Argentina and Brazil 
thereafter, have cast an unflattering light on the traditional strategies for 
dealing with financial crisis. The regnant approach has relied largely on the 
IMF's willingness to "lend into arrears," if necessary, to spearhead a bailout. 
As the recent crises have made clear, one problem with IMF-Ied bailouts is 
simply that the IMF does not have infinite funds at its disposal. The bailout of 
Mexioo in 1995 was a major success, for inst:;mce, but the need for substantial 
outside aid underscored the limits of the lMFs resources. A second problem 
is that bailouts create a serious risk of creditor moral hazard. If creditors know 
(or believe) they can count on the IMF to oome in and pick up the pieces when 
a sovereign defaults, they will be much more careless in their lending than 
would otherwise be the case. 
Not everyone has joined the sovereign bankruptcy bandwagon. The most 
vigorous opponents of an SDRM are the banks and lawyers who underwrite 
sovereign bonds in New York, together with investors that currently hold them. 
"We continue to believe that this is not a productive way forward," the head of 
2 For a useful cbronology of the IMF's increasing involvement, see Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy 
Procedure/or Sovereign Debtors?, 37 JNr'L LAW. 103 (2003). Scott points out that IMF debt bas increased 
neai/y a hundredfold since 1970, rising from $800 million in 1970 to $78.9 billion in 1999. Id. at 105. 
3 See JNr'L MONETARY FuND, THE DEsIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCJ"lJRING MECHANISM­
FuRTHER CONSIDERATIONS (2002) [hereinafter JNr'L MONETARY FuND, SDRM DESIGN), available 01 
http;l/www.imf.orgl extemaJInplpdrlsdnnl2002Jll2702.pdf. The IMF adjusted this proposal seveml months 
later: INT'L MONETARY FuND, PRoPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MEOlANISM 
(2003) [hereinafter INT'L MONETARY FuND, SDRM FEATURES], available at http://www.imf.orglexternallnp 
Ipdrlsdnnl2OO3/021W.pdf. "The new proposal followed seveml earlier, less detsiled IMF proposals that were 
delivem! by Anne Krueger, the lMF's FIts< Deputy Managing DirectOt. See, e.g., Anne O. Krueget, New 
Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Address Before Institute for 
International Economics (Apr. I, 20(2), available at http://www.imf.otglextemaJInp/speecl1es12002lO40102. 
htm. 
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the Institute of International Finance (llF) has complained. "[A]t a time of 
extreme risk-aversion in emerging markets, when capital flows are falling ... 
approaches such as [the IMF plan] add further to uncertainty and investor 
anxiety. ,,4 The hostility reflected in statements like this is based in part on 
principle and in part on obvious self-interest. The principled objection to 
sovereign bankruptcy is the risk that an SDRM will make it too easy for 
sovereign debtors to default. Much as bailouts create moral hazard on the part 
of creditors, sovereign bankruptcy could have a similar effect· on debWrs;-­
Limiting sovereign debtors' ability to restructure, on this view, encourages 
sovereigns to repay what they owe. The less principled explanation for the. 
underwriters' and investors' opposition is simply that the existing bailout 
approach often assures that bondholders will be made whole. If an SDRM 
replaced bailouts as the strategy of choice, sovereign debt holders could no 
longer count on a handout when sovereigns encountered financial distress. 
Rather than either sovereign bankruptcy or the status quo, some observers, 
including the U.S. Treasury, have advocated still another, intermediate strategy 
for addressing sovereign financial distress: sovereign debtors, they argne, 
could use collective action provisions (also referred to as "CACs" or 
"majority voting provisions") to restructure sovereign debt.' CAC provisions 
authorize a specified majority, often seventy-five percent, of the holders of an 
issuance of bonds to agree to restructure the bond's payment or timing terms. 
Sovereign debt issued under U.K. law, which currently constitutes roughly 
forty percent of sovereign debt, already includes these provisions, but until 
recently New York bonds did not: Collective action enthusiasts argne that, if 
CACs were included in all sovereign debt, these provisions would provide a 
simpler and less intrusive way to restructure sovereign debt if necessary. 
Skeptics, on the other hand, have pointed out that collective action provisions 
4 Michael M. Phillips, Bush Clears Way for Treaty Thar Eases Bankruptcies for Developing Nations� 
WALL ST. 1. EuR., Sept. 17,2002, at A2 (quoting Charles Dallara and describing the Ill' as "the research ann 
of 325 financial institutions and investors »). 
5 For a fascinating and ambitious account of the benefits of collective action provisions, see Lee C. 
Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORyL.J. 1317(2002). -
6 In 2003, Mexico registered an issuance of New York bonds that included a voting provision, 
apparently after strong encouragement by the U.S. Treasury to include the provision. See, e.g., John Authers, 
Mexico Sends Strong Signal with Bond Clauses, FIN. TlMEs, Feb. 27, 2003, at 31. Since then, other sovereign 
issues have followed suit. For dlscussion, see� for example, Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser� The Reform of the 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process: Problems, Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode, 1 J. 
REsTRuCTIJRlNG FIN. 1,6 (2004). 
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are an inadequate substitute for the benefits of sovereign bankruptcy-benefits 
such as global rather than ad hoc restructuring and access to interim financing.? 
Now is an anspicious time to take a closer look at sovereign bankruptcy 
given the enormous importance of the decision whether to establish an SDRM. 
The early sovereign bankruptcy proposals were understandably vague; they 
tended to identify the key attributes of an effective bankruptcy framework 
without hanunering out the specific details.' Now that sovereign bankniptcy is 
no longer simply speculative, the IMP and other policymakers have started 
venturing inside the "black box" to offer more complete proposals for 
sovereign bankruptcy. The goal of this Article is to contribute to this 
discussion by offering both careful analysis and a novel perspective on the key 
issues. 
Perhaps the single most important theme of our analysis-a theme to which 
we will recur to repeatedly-is the importance of promoting adherence to 
absolute priority wherever possible: Now, for many critics of sovereign 
bankruptcy, this is precisely the problem witfr an SDRM. As discussed above, 
the most frequent objection to sovereign bankruptcy is that an SDRM would 
make it too easy for sovereigns to defanlt, thusinterferingwith creditors' rights­
and roiling sovereign credit markets. Existing evidence suggests that the 
complaints are overstated. Sovereigns are reluctant-to.· default· (;In their debt,. .. 
and do so only as a last resort because of the reputational consequences of 
default in the event the sovereign wishes to return to the credit mark�ts in the 
future. Similarly, sovereign debtors value their membership in the IMP and its 
programs, so they go out of their way to repay their obligations inhere is any 
way they can, lest the sovereign jeopardize its relationship with the IMP. 
The more surprising and interesting point, however, is this: sovereign 
bankruptcy can actually assure greater adherence to absolute priority than the 
status quo. Because it is often impracticable to lend to sovereigns on a 
collateralized basis, creditors currently have great difficulty assuring that their 
priorities will be honored. Even ostensibly collateralized obligations, 
moreover, may not gnarantee priority treatment. When EcuadOr raced a debt 
7 Perhaps in part due to this concern, lhe U.S. Treasury, a prominent supporter ofCACS, has not entirely 
ruled out a more ambitious approach towatd debt restructuring. 
g The first article to attempt a more extensive analysis was Schwarez, supra note 1. 
• Absolute priority is the general requirement that higher priority creditors be paid in full before lower 
priority creditors receive anything. For a recent assessment of the costs and benefits of deviating from 
absolute priority, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy, 'Sl J. 
FIN. 445 (2002). 
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crisis in 1999, observers assumed that its collateralized Brady Bonds would 
have priority over its uncollateralized bonds. But Ecuador opened 
restructuring negotiations with holders of the collateralized bonds first., and in 
doing so, effectively undermined the ostensible seniority structure.19 When 
push came to shove, the priorities simply collapsed, a result that several 
prominent commentators think "is likely to drive away potential senior 
creditors." II 
We argue in this Article that the classification and voting rules of an 
SDRM can be used to address this problem. The emphasis on creditor 
priorities is an important distinction between our proposal and the plan that has 
been advocated by the IMF. Although the IMF plan, like ours, is designed to 
solve the ex post collective action problems that interfere with creditors' ability 
to restructure troubled sovereign debt, the IMF does not systematically 
consider the ex ante implications of the SDRM. By focusing almost 
exclusively on ex post considerations, the IMF has not been able to respond 
satisfactorily to debtors' and creditors' concerns that the SDRM may result in 
higher costs of borrowing and a lower volume of debt for emerging-market 
countries. Our proposal remedies this shortcoming by taking the ex ante 
effects of the SDRM much more fully into account. A central theme of our 
analysis is that, by promoting adherence to absolute priority, the SDRM could 
plausibly result in lower costs of borrowing ex ante. 
As a baseline, we argue that the SDRM should enforce strict, flrst-in-time 
absolute priority. Bonds issued first would have priority over those issued later 
unless the sovereign and its creditors explicitly contracted around this' rule. 
The only exceptions to flrst-in-time priority would involve trade debt., which 
would always be treated as a priority obligation, and collateralized lending 
(which would be giverypriority treatment under some circumstances). Against 
this backdrop, we propose a two-step classification and voting process for 
confirming a restructuring plan. The debtor would first make a proposal as to 
how much its overall debt would be scaled back-that is, how large the overall 
"haircut" to creditors would be. H a majority of all creditors approved the 
haircut., the second step would simply entail reducing the creditors' claims in 
10 Ecuador apparently negotiated with the collaternlized bonds first because the bonds gave the country a . 
thirty-<lay grace period, dnring which Ecuador would not technically be in default. See BARRY J. 
ElCHENGREEN & CIIR1sTOF RUEHL. THE BAlL-IN PROBLEM: SYSTEMATIC GOALS, AD Hoc MEANS 16-17 (Nat'l 
Bureau of Beon. Research, Womng Paper No. W7653, Apr. 20(0). available at http://ssrn.rornlabstract 
=228127. 
11 ld. at 18. 
768 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [VoL 53 
this amount, starting with the lowest priority creditors and working up the 
priority hierarchy. This two-step approach not only would reinforce the 
creditors' priorities within the SDRM, but also would clarify their priorities 
outside of the restructuring process. 
In addition to classification and voting, the Artiele also·offers new insights 
into four other key issnes. The fIrst is whether litigation should be stayed 
when a sovereign initiates the bankruptcy process. Although the stay is less 
crucial for sovereigns than with ordinary debtors, since it is difficnlt to 
foreclose on sovereign assets, we argue that the SDRM should include at least 
a limited stay. We propose in particular that the SDRM impose a stay oli asset 
seizures, but that litigation by creditors otherwise be pennitted to go forward. 
As an alternative, sovereigns conld be pennitted to appeal to the SDRM for 
injunctive relief in the event creditors obtain a jUdgment. Both approaches 
have the virtue of halting potentially destructive creditor collection efforts 
without interfering with activities that are unlikely to impede the restructuring 
effort. 
The second issue is fmancing the restructuring process. Every existing 
SDRM proposal calls for an approach m0d0led on t1:Jg debtor-in-possession­
(DIP) fInancing provision that anthorizes interim fInancing for U.S. corporate 
debtors, but the proposals differ signifIcantly in their details... The framework 
we propose is based on a simple distinction between proposals we categorize 
as presumptively pennissible, and those that are presu�e� impermissible.. 
Because of the risk that priority treatment for the DIP lender will encourage 
overborrowing, we argue that the presumptively permissible category should 
be limited to the fInancing of the sovereign's trade debt. Although larger loans 
would not be prohibited, they would be permitted only if a majority of the 
sovereign's creditors agreed to the fInancing. 
The third issue is who should oversee the restructuring process. On this 
question, this Article calls for a sharply different approach than does the IMP 
or the prior literature. The most prominent recent proposals would vest 
authority in a panel of experts set up by a new O! existing intematiomd" 
organization. The problem with this approach is that both the selection process 
and the panel's decisioumaking would be susceptible to political jockeying. 
Rather than oversight by committee, we argue that the sovereign debtor should 
be pennitted to choose, as SDRM decisionmaker, the bankruptcy or insolvency 
court of any jurisdiction where the sovereign has. issued bonds. (Currently, this . 
is likely to mean New York, London, Frankfurt, or Tokyo.) Not only would 
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judges make better decisionrnakers than the experts selected by a bureaucratic 
process, but giving sovereigns a choice would promote jurisdictional 
competition and. as a result, further enhance the decisionmaking process. The 
competition would be loosely analogous to the benefits of venue choice for 
corporate debtors in the United States. 
The final major issue we consider is one that has not been addressed at all 
by prior commentators: whether the SDRM should be mandatory, or whether 
sovereigns should have the choice of opting out of the framework by crafting 
their own SDRM provisions. We argue that there are bOth theoretical and 
practical reasons to permit opt-out. From a theoretical perspective, opt-out 
would enhance efficiency by enabling a country to tailor the SDRM to its own 
circumstances. More practically, the opt-out option might increase sovereign 
debtors' willingness to agree to an SDRM. We also consider whether 
provisions that make the SDRM harsher should be precluded. Although 
sovereigns arguably have too great an incentive to agree to harsh provisions, 
we conclude, on balance, that opt-out should not be restricted in most cases. 
Each of our proposals is designed to take both theoretical and political 
considerations into account. The framework we propose is entire.\'ynew, but it 
is shaped by the reality that political considerations are likely to rule some 
theoretically attractive solutions as out of bounds. 
Part I of this Article explores the principal alternatives to sovereign 
bankruptcy-collective action provisions and the status quo-and explains 
why neither is an adequate substitute for an SDRM. In Part II, we prO'Vide It 
brief overview of the IMF's current proposal and note some of its principal 
shortcomings-primarily:;its inadequate consideration of the SDRM's ex ante 
effects. Parts ill through VII then develop our proposal. Part ill takes up the 
question whether to impose a stay on litigation. Part IV then gets to the heart 
of the SDRM and outlines the classification and voting scheme. Part V 
addresses the issue of interim fmancing. In Part VI, we defend our argument 
that oversight should be vested in existing bankruptcy and insolvency courts. 
We then complete the discussion by discussing opt-out in Part VII and tie the 
analysis together with a brief conclusion. I> 
12 Because our emphasis in this Article is on the contours of the sovereign bankruptcy framework itself, 
we do not discuss the question of implementation. A brief note is therefore in order here. Several of our 
proposal8-;SJJch as the proposed standstill and the use of majority voting for the restructuring of a sovereign's 
debt-would require an amendment to the JMF's Articles of Agteement. Amendment of the Articles of 
Agreement require the approval of 85% of member -country votes_ For a much more detailed discussion. see 
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. 
L WHY Do WE NEED A SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY FRAMEwoRK? 
Establishing a sovereign bankruptcy framework ranks quite high on just 
about any scale of intrusiveness one can imagine when it comes to dealing with 
sovereign debt issues. Now that the IMF has thrown its weight behind the 
concept, there is more support for some kind of SDRM than ever before. But 
sovereign bankruptcy would mark a significant departure from existing 
practice. And many of the central players in the world of sovereign debt-' . 
ranging from the Wall Street banks that underwrite much of the debt to some 
of the sovereign debtors themselves-are opposed to this strategy. 
Given this resistance, we begin by asking whether sovereign bankruptcy is 
really necessary. Both in the literature and in practice, partisans have argued 
fervently for two kinds of alternatives to a full-blown SDRM. First, some 
commentators have argued that we should leave things right where they are, 
not despite the difficulty sovereigns have in restructuring their obligations in 
times of financial distress, but because of it. These commentators extol the 
benefits of tough restrictions on ex post renegotiation. The second option is to 
rely on majority voting provisions in sovereign debt. Advocates of this 
approach believe it is necessary to facilitate a restructuring in the event the 
sovereign encounters financial distress, but they believe that the best way to do 
this is by including voting provisions in each issue of sovereign bonds. 
The ,discussion that follows briefly considers each of these. alternatives. 
Unfortunately, neither the status quo nor contractual voting provisions are an 
adequate response to sovereign financial turmoil. 
A. Tough Love: Making It Hard to Restructure Sovereign Debt 
The simplest solution of all would be to leave things more or less as they 
are, and several important commentators have called for precisely this.!3 
Advocates of the status quo acknowledge that the sovereign debt restructuring 
process is highly inefficient under current conditions, but they see the ex post 
inefficiency as a virtue rather than a problem. The key benefit of tough ' 
restructuring rules, on this view, comes from their ex ante effect. Because 
IMF. SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3, at 70-73. Our proposal could be implemented through the same process 
contemplated by the IMF. 
13 The leading proponent ofthls view has been Michael Dooley. See MiCHAELP, DooLEY, CAN 0UrPtrr 
LoSSES FOLLOWING iN'rnRNATlONAL FINANCIAL CRISES BE AVOIDED? (Nat'J Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Worl<ing Paper No, W753 I, Feb. 20(0), availabk at http://ssm.comiabstract=216008.
' 
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sovereign debtors know they cannot easily renegotiate their debt ex post, they 
will have a powerful incentive to repay the obligations. More flexible 
renegotiation rnles, by contrast, would undermine the sovereign's commitment 
to repay and woul� increase the sovereign's ex ante costs of borrowing. 
The observation that imposing high ex post renegotiation costs can impose 
valuable discipline on a borrower is well taken. But this insight assumes that 
borrowers will respond to these incentives by choosing a level of debt that 
optimally balances the debtor's ex ante borrowing costs with its ex post costs 
of financial distress. Sovereign debtors, by contrast, often have built-in 
incentives to commit themselves to excessively high restructuring costs, rather 
than optimal ones.'" In part, these incentives are political. Political leaders are 
more concerned about .short-term issues such as how much they can borrow 
rather than long-term ramifications such as the potential consequences of 
default since the current administration will usually be gone by the time any 
repayment difficulties arise. Somewhat similarly, current leaders may borrow 
to further their own goals even if the effect is to impose inordinate 
restructuring costs on the country as a whole. In addition to these political 
considerations, sovereign debtors who are good credit risks may agree to 
excessive restructuring costs for signaling purposes, to indicate that they are 
unlikely to default. The creditors of a sovereign debtor may be similarly 
anxious for the debtor to, like mysses, bind itself to the mast, because high 
restructuring costs can serve as a form of implicit priority vis-a-vis debt that is 
less difficult to restructure. Finally, the fact that excessive restructuring costs 
increase the likelihood of a bailout in the event of financial distress. may give 
the parties another reason to gravitate toward debt that is too difficult to 
restructure. � 
Putting large barriers in the way of restructuring, as current sovereign debt 
practice does, has important downsides even before any default. Because it is 
difficult to establish enforceable priorities in sovereign debt, creditors adjust by 
insisting on priority substitutes such as a rapid repayment schedule." 
Inefficiently short maturities can create a rollover crisis when the debt comes 
J4 The analysis that follows draws on Patrick Bolton, Towards a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World. IMF STAFF PAPERS, Sept 
2003, at 41, 61-62. Bob RaslIl!lSsen makes a similar point in his article for this Symposium. Robert K. 
Rasmussen. Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY LJ. 1163 (2004). 
15 For a more detailed analysis of this problem. see Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and 
Restructuring Sovereign De& The Role of Seniority (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors). 
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due, and the cnSlS is likely to be exacerbated if there are significant 
impediments to restructuring. 
In sum, although the prospect of high restructuring costs can have 
beneficial ex ante effects, it is not likely to work well in the sovereign debt 
context. Sovereign debtors have too great an incentive to include excessi:vely 
stringent limitations on restructuring. A better approaclI must provide more 
. flexibility to restructure the sovereign debtor's obligations in the event of 
fmancial distress. It must consider the ex post costs of financial distress, such 
as the perverse effects of debt overhang in the event debt cannot be 
restructured, rather than just the ex ante costs. 
B. Can Majority Voting Provisions Solve the Problem? 
The other major alternative to sovereign bankruptcy assumes just this: that 
. sovereign debters need the flexibility to restructure their debt if they face a 
fmancial crisis. Rather than a full-blown SDRM, however, proponents of this 
view argue that existing bond contracts-perhaps· with a few modifications­
are fully adequate to the task.. The silver bullet, in their view, is to use majority 
voting provisions (also known as CACs) to restructure troubled sovereign debt. 
These clauses provide that, if a specified majority, often seventy-five percent, 
. of the bonabolders vote to restructure the paymenUenns of th�debt, alLof the 
holders of the bonds in question are bound by the vote. Sovereign debtors 
already include majority voting provisions in deht they issue .under U.K. 
law-roughly forty percent of all sovereign debt'6_and they already have been 
used in a few cases to restructure sovereign debt. Majority voting advocates 
argue that, if sovereigns included these provisions in all of their debt, CACs 
could provide most or all of the benefits of sovereign bankruptcy and sidestep 
the political and administrative obstacles to putting a bankruptcy framework in 
place.17 
We should emphasize from the beginning that we share some of the 
enthusiasm for majority voting provisions. To the extent that CACs enhance 
the prospects for restructuring, they are an improvement over the unaninrotiS . 
action strictures that have traditionally characterized sovereign debt issued 
16 See, e.g., EICHENGREEN & RUEHL, supra note. 10, at 2 n.3; supra notes 5-6 and ac.companying text 
U For a f2scirrating discussion of collective action provisions. and proposals for improving them, see 
Buchheit & Gulati. supra note 5. See also William W. Bratton & G. Mitu GuIati� Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring and the Best Interest of Creditors. SJ V AND. L. REv (forthcoming 20(4) (analyzing collective 
action provisions and choice between majority voting and unanimity requirement). 
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under U.S. law. Moreover, the most elegant defenders of the CAC approach 
have emphasized that its chief advantages over an SDRM are pragmatic rather 
than theoreticaL CACs are a solution that is well within our grasp, they argue, 
whereas SDRMs are not:'· Even if every sovereign debt issue included a 
CAC,'· however, there are at least four serious limitations that make the 
majority voting strategy a poor substitute for sovereign bankruptcy. 
The first limitation is that majority voting provisions do not provide for a 
sufficiently comprehensive restructuring. It is not accidental that the sovereign 
debtors that have used these provisions to restructure their debt have tended to 
be small countries with a relatively simple debt profile. Majority voting 
provisions can work fme if the sovereign has only issued a few different bonds, 
but the bond-by-bond restructuring strategy is much less effective if there are 
numerous different bonds, with different maturities and payout terms, to deal 
with. Moreover, this approach does not provide any mechanism for addressing 
the sovereign's nonbond debt. In short, CACs are only adequate to the task if 
the sovereign's borrowings are relatively simple; they are much less useful if 
the sovereign has a more complicated debt profile. 
The historical antecedents of Chapter 11, the U.S. provisions for corporate 
restructuring, provide a useful illustration of this point. The early U.S. 
reorganizations known as "equity receiverships" involved the nation's 
railroads, which had unusually convoluted capital structures. When the 
reorganizers restructured the railroads, they did not simply restructure the 
bonds one issue at a time. Rather, the bankers and lawyers formed committees 
for each class of public st6ck or debt, negotiated the terms of a restructuring 
not just for these claimants but for other debtholders as well, and then formed a 
single supercommittee to effect the reorganization:" The actions of individual 
18 E.g., E-mail from Lee C. Buchheit, Partner. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. to David A Skeel, Jr.. 
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Dec. 11.2002) (on file with authors). 
19 One of the objections frequently lodged against the campaign fur majority voting is that it would not 
affect the many bonds that have already been issued and do not have CACs. See, e.g., EICHENGREEN & 
RUEHL, supra note 10� at 12 (noting this objection). We put this objection to one side, both because it is a 
transition problem rather than a permanent 1imitation. and because CACs could be added to existing bonds 
through exchange offers if sovereign debtors and their creditors were persuaded of their desirability. 
20 The comp1exity of the railroads' capital structure, rather than simply negotiability concerns, almost 
certainly was one of the reasons that U.S. issuers were much less likely than their V.l<. counterparts to include 
CACs in their corporate bonds. See David A. Skeel. Jr.. Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It Ail?, 52 
EMORY L.J. 417 (2002) (drawing on the equity receivership analogy and responding to Buchheit & Gulati. 
supra note 5). For a more skeptical view of the eqUity receivership analogy. see Stephen J. Lubhen, Out oirhe 
Past: Railroads and Sovereign Debt Restructuring. 35 GEO. J. INT'L I.. (fortheoming 20(4). 
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committees alone would not have sufficed to sort out the fmancial chaos.2l 
Sovereign borrowers need a similarly comprehensive solution to financial 
distress. 
The second problem with CACs is closely related: not only does majority 
voting fail to provide a comprehensive solution wfinancial dis�, but it-also 
will often leave the sovereign with too much debt. 22 Creditors will trade off the 
efficiency benefits of debt reductions against the costs in terms of reduced 
expected debt repayments; as a result, a debt restructuring procedure that is too 
creditor-friendly may result in inefficiently low debt forgiveness." By 
contrast, statutory bankruptcy regimes can be adjusted to be more debtor­
friendly if this kind of inefficiency is a concern. 
Less often recognized, but crucially important, is a third limitation of 
CACs: the danger that they will undermine absolute priority. Even under the 
best of conditions, establishing priority and achieving the efficiency benefits of 
this differentiation are quite difficult in the sovereign debt context. It is harder 
for sovereigns than for corporate debtors �Gffer collateral, for instance, and. 
enforcement is quite tricky when the debt does purport to provide security. As 
a substitute for collateral, sovereigns have relied Oft· differential repayment 
schedules and implicit priorities. If debt restructuring is left to the market, 
there is no clear way to gnarantee that the. parties' .agreedcon priorities will 
actually be respected if the sovereign encounters fmancial distress. As noted 
earlier, the restructuring of Ecuador's debt in 1999 is a..good illustration." 
Although some of Ecuador's Brady Bonds were collateralized and thought to 
have priority, these bonds were actually restructured first, prior to EcmIdor's' 
21 For a discussion of the fonnation and activities of sovereign bondholder committees in the early 
twentieth century, one which points ont some of their limitations, see Bany Eichengreen & Richard Portes, 
Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, in CRIsIS? WHAT CRIsIs? ORDERLY 
WORKOUTS FOR SoVEREIGN DEBToRs 3, 28-30 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Partes eds., 1995). 
22 The discussion tho! follows is draWn from Bolton. supra note 14, at 64. We should emphasize that 1he 
point here is relative; even a comprehensive restructuring mechanism can leave debtors with too- much debt. 
See. e.g .. Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure: Evidence from Financially Distressed 
Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997) (empirical study showing the !inns reduce debt more in Chapter 11 than in 
nonbankruptcy workouts, but that Chapter 11 !inns retain a high debt load); Marl< J. Roe, &nf<ruptcy and 
Debt: A New Model for Corporate Recrganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983) (considering factors tho! 
may induce 1he parties to agree to Chapter 11 reorganization plans tl\at do not eliminate enough deb;1:' 
Bankruptcy, however, is likely to produce a more thorough restructuring than CACs and otl1er nonbankruptcy 
approaches. 
23 See, e.g., Elhanan Helpman, Volunmry Debt &duction: Incentives and Welfar e, in ANALYTICAL 
issUES IN DEBT 279 (Jacob A. Frenkel et aI. eds., 1989); Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy snd Entrepreneurship: 
The Value of a Fresh Start (Oct. 6, 2(03), available at ht!p:lIssrn.comIabstract=463000. 
24 Seesupranores 10-11 and acrompanying text. 
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noncollateralized . Brady Bonds." The restructuring tllUS turned the bonds' 
ostensible priority scheme on its head. 
A final shortcoming of majority voting is that it does not address the 
sovereign's need for new tmancing. An essential part of U.S. corporate 
reorganization practice is the possibility of obtaining DIP financing to preserve 
the going-concern value of the firm. If anything, DIP financing may be even 
more critical for sovereigns because of their vulnerability to capital flight and 
exchange rate crises .. The IMF's pattern of lending into arrears serves a similar 
function, but the IMF has not tied its lending to the negotiation of a 
restructuring agreement between the sovereign and its creditors. As a result, 
the IMF's lending often has the perverse effect of encouraging creditors to 
drag their feet, delaying restructuring negotiations in the hope that the IMF will 
step in and provide new money." 
Rather than relying on the IMF, majority voting advocates have argued that 
bondholders can coordinate among themselves to facilitate DIP financing. If 
new lending on a priority basis will solve the sovereign's underinvestment 
problem, they argue, all of the creditors will be better off if they vote to 
subordinate their own interests in favor of the new lender." But this.strategy 
suffers from several of the same limitations that we have already seen. If the 
sovereign's debt structure is at all complex, coordinating all of the bonds and 
holding a vote to pave the way for new financing would be complicated and 
often unworkable. Moreover, the financing would be further undermined by 
the difficulty of guaranteeing that the new lender's priority would be honored 
if the sovereign experienced further financial difficulties down the road. 
There are a variety of ways one could structure the DIP financing 
provisions in an SDRM, and we will explore the alternatives in detail in Part 
V. The important point for present purposes is that majority voting provisions 
do not provide a workable solution to the problem of securing financing during 
the restructuring process. We should emphasize that this does not mean that 
policymakers should discourage sovereigns from including CACs in their 
bonds. Even if an SDRM were adopted, some sovereigns could still use 
majority voting provisions to restructure their obligations ontside of the 
SDRM, just as some corporations restructure their debt outside of Chapter 1 1  
25 See, e.g., ElCHENGREEN & RUEm..,.sitpra note 10, at 18. 
2. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Cleaning Up Third World Debt Without Getting Takeii to th� 
Cleaners, 1. BeaN. PERsP., Wmter 1990, at 31. 
TI Buchheit & GuIali, supra note 5, at 1348·51. 
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or other formal insolvency provisions. But, in many sovereign debt crises, 
CACs are not an adequate substitute for a full-blown SDRM. 
II. HALF A LOAF: THE IMF's PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY FRAMEwORK 
The most important development since Anne Krueger put forward the idea 
of an SDRM, thus signaling the IMF's commitment to that approach, is the 
more detailed draft proposal outlined by the IMF staff in late 2002, and furtheI 
adjusted in February 2003."" The discussion that fonows will provide a brief, 
critical assessment of the key attributes of the.IMF proposal. This discussion 
will set the stage for our own proposal, to be developed in the Parts that follow. 
From our viewpoint, the most notable thing about the proposal is the 
important inspiration it draws from corporate bankruptcy principles and 
practice.'" The general principles underlying the IMF's proposal are the same 
as those generally advocated by legal scholars and economists for corporate 
bankruptcy. In particular, the IMF purports to go beyond existing contractual 
solutions and attempts to set up a comprehensive statutory approach to 
sovereign debt restructuring. 
The IMF's gniding concern is to resolve collective action problems among 
dispersed creditors in debt restructuring negotiations.- while preserving creditor 
contractual rights as much as possible.'" Viewed from this perspective, the key 
element in the IMF's proposed mechanism is a majority vote among creditors 
on a restructuring plan, which would bind a dissenting minority." With the 
aim of preserving creditor rights as much as possible, the IMF's plan generally 
does not envisage a stay on litigation and individual debt collection efforts or a 
standstill on debt payments." The IMF's main stated justification for not 
introducing an automatic stay into an SDRM is that sovereign assets are much 
28 IMF, SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3. 
29 For an extensive analysis of the relevance of corporate bankruptcy principles to an SDRM. see Bohon. 
supra note 14. See also Skeel, supra note 20 (response to Buchheit & Gulati. supra note 5, analogizing to 
equity receiverships in u.s. bankruptcy history). 
30 IMP, SDRM: DESIGN, supra note 3, at 7 (suggesting that the SDRM provisions should "resolve[] a 
critical collective action problem" but do so "in a manner that minimizes interference with contractual rights 
and obligations"). 
31 [d. at 10 (calling for voting threshold of seventy·five percent of registered and verified claims). 
32 ld. at 9-10 (conc1uding that there should be "no generalized stay on enforcement"). The November 
27, 2002. proposal did leave open the possibility of a creditor vote to impose a stay on a specified action,. id. at 
35, and the IMF subsequently suggested that a stay might be imposed-if reqtresre&brtbe-sovereign debloF"""· 
approved by both a creditors committee and the SDRM decisionmaker. IMF, SDRM FEATURES, supra note 3, 
at 11·12. 
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harder to collect than corporate assets. Lengthy and uncertain litigation may 
be required and even if the creditor plaintiff prevails, it is likely that a 
restructuring agreement would already have been approved, which could limit 
the plaintiff's gain. 
The main limitation on plaintiffs' gains envisioned by the IMF is refleeted· 
in international insolvency law: the Hotchpot rule. This rule requires that any 
payment or asset collected by a plaintiff through litigation must be offset 
against the plaintiff's claim in the restructuring agreement.33 That is, any new 
claim the plaintiff would be entitled to in the restructuring agreement would be 
reduced by an amount equal to what the creditor obtained through legal action. 
Should the plaintiff obtain more than what the restructuring agreement 
specifies then the Hotchpot rule could be supplemented with a "claw-back" 
provision. The IMF's original proposal does not allow for such a provision on 
the grounds that it would be impractical, but the Hotchpot rule was added as a 
possible option in the [mal version of the proposal.34 
The Hotchpot rule clearly reduces incentives for private litigation, but it 
does not eliminate them. Also, it does not directly address the concern that 
private litigation may be undertaken mainly as a negotiation or delaying tactic. 
for example, by umJerrnining the sovereign's ability to trade. The IMF's 
proposed plan recogillzes this issue by proposing that the judge could have 
authority to stay specific legal actions on request of the debtor and subject to 
approval of creditors. 
The voting provision and the Hotchpot rule are the centerpieces of the 
IMF's proposed plan. The plan also contains many more technical provisions 
dealing with notification of creditors, registration, and verification of claims." 
As in corporate bankruptcy this can be a lengthy and difficult process. An 
important additional comtlication is that the ultimate ownership of a sovereign 
bond is hard to trace. The court must be able to pierce through the veil of 
beneficial ownership to be able to ascertain whether the votes on a particular 
bond are controlled by the sovereign. Should that be the case, these votes 
should be ineligible for obvious conflict-of-interest reasons.3• Arelated 
33 lMF, SDRM DESIGN, supra note 3, at 35-37 (explaining and adopting the Hotchpot rule used for-' 
corporate debtors in some jurisdictions). 
34 Id. at 37; IMF, SDRM FEATIlRES, supra note 3, at 10-1!. 
35 See, e.g., IMF. SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3. at 8-9 (summarizing provisions for detenn.ining "eligible 
claims"). 
36 The problem of sovereign control of key claim� and through these claims., of a vote by creditors, 
figured prominently in a sovereign debt dispute involving Brazil in t1!.e 19905. Through Banco di Brasil. which 
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difficulty is that for widely dispersed debt structures, many claims may not be 
registered in time. Given the large number of claims that will fail to qualify, a 
requirement that a supennajority of "registered" claims approve the plan may 
function more like a simple majority requirement in practice, thus resulting in a 
weaker protection of creditors. These difficulties underscore the need for a 
court-supervised restructuring procedure as well as the important benefits that 
might be available with the establishment of an international clearinghouse. 
As the main focus of the IMP's proposed plan is on the resolution of 
collective action problems among sovereign bondholders, the mechanism is 
under-inclusive and incomplete on the two other major facets of a restructuring 
procedure: the provision of priority financing and the enforcement of absolute 
priority. The plan's only means of enforcing absolute priority is through the 
exclusion of several classes of debt from the SDRM. Thus, the plan proposes 
to exclude privileged claims, obligations to international organizations such as 
the IMP (multilaterals), and debt owed to other nations (the Paris. Club). A 
first difficnlty with this approach is that it implicitly recognizes a higher 
priority to Paris Club debt as a fait accompli anti singles out by default private · ·  
investors as the main target for debt reduction. This difficulty is compounded 
by the discretion given to the debtor under the pian to include or exclude debt 
claims, such as trade credit, claims on the central bank, and the like, from the 
SDRM.37 Again, this discretion gives the debtor considerable -power. to. · 
undermine a given priority structure and to cut side deals with particular 
creditor classes in exchange for an exclusion of the claims from the formal 
SDRM proceedings. Yet another difficulty is that the plan does not address 
collective action problems among privileged claimholders, nor does it deal 
with the incentives of individual bondholders to obtain a lien on an asset 
through private litigation during the debt restructuring phase. 
The plan recognizes some of these difficulties and proposes as an 
alternative to include Paris Club debt in the SDRM under a separate class." 
The plan also allows for other forms of classification and gives the debtor 
discretion to classify under the general requirement that classification does not 
had participated in a syndicated loan agreement, Brazil managed lD thwart an effort by other bolders of the 
debt lD accelerate the amounts due under the loan. CIBC Bank & TruSLCO. v. BaDOO Central do Bmsil,.&86..F • . •  
Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to intervene lD impose implied obligations of good faith and fair 
dealing). For discussion and criticism, see Bratton & Gulati. supra note, 17. 
37 See IMF, SDRM DESIGN, supra note 3, at 13  ("[AJ deblDr may decide lD exclude certain types of 
claims from a restructming. particularly where such exclusion is needed to limit·the extent of ecooomic antI-­
financial dislocation."). 
" [d. at 24-25. 
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result in "unjustified discrimination of creditor groups. ,,39 While classification 
briHgs aboRt greater fleKibility, it is important to understand that it does not 
guarantee in any way enforcement of absolute priority. To the contrary, as 
currently structured, the IMP's plan may well facilitate deviations from 
"abs1:rluwpriorityily'giving a veto power, unconstrained by a cramdown or best 
interest rule, to a junior creditor class. 
fust ·as the !MF's plan does not systematically address the issue of 
enforcing absolute priority it only gives lip service to the issue of DIP 
financing. Again, with the objective of preserving creditor contractual rights 
as much as possible, the !MF's proposed plan only allows for "priority 
financing" if it is approved by "75 percent of outstanding principal of 
registered claims."" The main purpose of DIP fmancing is to address an 
immediate cash crisis and allow the debtor to function while the restructuring 
negotiations are ongoing." Clearly, a creditor vote would be extremely difficult 
to organize in a timely fashion, making it virtually impossible to organize any 
such fmancing. 
The last key component of the IMP's plan is its proposal to set up an 
independent Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum (SDDRF) to oversee 
the sovereign bankruptcy process." The selection of judges to be appointed to 
the SDDRF would be delegated to a selection panel designated by the IMF s  
Managing Director and charged with the task of making up a shortlist of 
candidate judges who might be impaneled when a debt crisis arises. The final 
shortlist would be subject to approval of the IMP's governing board. The 
president of the SDD¥ would be charged with the selection of the final group 
of four judges to be impaneled in the event of a crisis. While the plan goes to 
considerable lengths to guarantee the independence of the SDDRF, it is still 
worth noting that this procedure is not a foolproof method to guarantee such 
independence. 
The court would have·more limited powers than a bankruptcy court in the 
. _ United States. .Its powers would be limited to the registration of claims, 
supervision of the voting, and the fmal certification of the agreements. In 
39 Id. at 53. 
"" Id. at 10. 
41 In the corporate context in the United Stat�. debtors invariably arrange their DIP financing before 
they even file for bankruptcy. See, e.g., David A. Skeel. Jr.. The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-m­
Possession Finan.cing� 25 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 2004-). 
42 The parameteIs of the SDDRF, as described i n  the text that follows, are outlined in IMP, SDRM 
DESIGN. supra note 3, at 56-70. 
780 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53 
addition, the court would have the power to resolve disputes and to grant 
injunctive relief subject to the creditors' approval. These are very limited 
powers, which do not include important powers of U.S. bankruptcy judges 
such as the power to subpoena and the power to impose sanctions on parties 
acting in bad faith during the restructuring process. Nevertheless, the SDDRF 
does have some important powers, such as the authority to exclude evidence 
and to terminate the process. These powers could be sufficient to enable the 
court to supervise the restructuring process effectively. 
Overall, the IMP piau is an extremely important development in our 
thinking about how best to address sovereign debt crises. As this brief 
overview makes clear, however, it also has a variety of limitations. Most 
importantly. the IMP pIau focuses extensively on the ex post issue of solving 
creditors' collective action problems. but it pays much less attention to the 
equally important issue of the ex aute effects of an SDRM, particularly, the 
need to honor creditors' priorities in order to facilitate sovereign credit 
markets. As we outline our proposal in the Parts that follow, we will place 
particular emphasis on the possibility olusihg an SDRM not only to solve 
creditors' collective action problems, but also to promote absolute priority. 
We also propose a less cumbersome approach to interim rrnancing aud call for 
a very different SDRM decisionmaker-existing bankruptcy and insolvency 
courts, rather than au international organization. 
m. THE NEED FOR A STAY ON ENFORCEMENT 
Having shown the need for a sovereign bankruptcy framework and briefly 
describing the IMP's proposed SDRM, we now tum to the more complex task 
of developing our own proposal. This Part begins the aualysis by considering 
whether the SDRM should include a stay on creditors' enforcement activities. 
After arguing for at least a limited stay, we conclude by briefly addressing the 
related issue of whether the initiation of sovereign bankruptcy should be 
voluntary (that is, by the sovereign), involuntary (by creditors), or a 
combination of the two. 
A. The Choice Among Automotic, Conditional, or No Stay 
An important function of bankruptcy is to solve creditors' coordination 
problems. Indeed. this arguably is bankruptcy's most important ex post 
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function. (Protecting creditors' priorities is, as we have emphasized, the most 
important ex ante objective.)" Bankruptcy enables the debtor's creditors, who 
may be numerous and widely scattered, to come together and develop a 
collective response to the debtor's financial distress." With ordinary corporate 
debtors, lawmakers have long worried that creditors may try to sidestep the 
collective proceeding, and engage in a "race to the courthouse" or "grab race" 
in an effort to get their money back before anyone else gets paid. Although 
this strategy is rational for individual creditors, it can destroy value by; ·for 
instance, forcing the piecemeal liquidation of assets that would be worth more 
as a going concern. 
U.S. bankruptcy law addresses the "grab race" concern by providing for an 
"automatic stay" of creditors' collection activities." From the moment a 
debtor (or its creditors) fIles for bankruptcy, creditors must cease and desist 
from all of their collection activities-no more litigation, no execution on 
liens, no more angry letters to the debtor's managers. In other nations, the stay 
is more limited. In England, for instance, secured creditors are not stayed" and 
some bankruptcy systems omit the stay altogether.47 
The debate as to whether sovereign bankruptcy should include a U.S.-style 
stay, a lesser stay, or no stay has focused on a crucial distinction between 
sovereigns and ordinary corporate debtors: it is much harder for creditors tG. 
enforce their interests against sovereigns. The sovereign's local assets usually 
cannot be seized, and most sovereign assets are within the country, which 
significantly limits a creditor' s enforcement options if the sovereign defaults. 
Some q6mmentators have argued that the obstacles obviate the need for a stay 
altogether. The "State's unilateral decision to suspend payments would 
produce virtually the same effect as a stay," according to one commentator.48 
Not ouly are stays unnecessary, according to this view, but the stay would 
43 See. e.g., supra note 9. 44 The classic theoretical account of bankruptcy as a solution to collective action problems is THOMAS H. 
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). 
45 1 1  U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000). 46 For an overview of the English insolvency ruJes, see, for example, John Armour et aI., Corporate 
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy l.iJw: Lessoru fram the United Kingdom. 55 V AND. L. 
REv. 1699. 1736·50 (2002). Secured creditors' rights have been tempered somewhat by the enacttnent of the 
Enterprise Act 2002. See. e.g., John Armour & Rizwaan Jameel Mokal. Reforming the Governance of 
Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002 (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
47 For a survey of the presence or absence of a stay in nations throughout the world as part of an 
assessment of creditors' rights generally. see Rafael La Porta et al .• Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. BcoN. l i B, 
1135 (1998). -48 Schwarcz. supra note 1, at 984. 
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"likely generate significant litigation on issues including when the stay should 
apply, when it should end, and what exceptions should be allowed."" Based 
on similar reasoning, as well as creditors' opposition to the inclusion of the 
stay, the IMF does not call for a stay in its most recent SDRM proposal.'" 
Although we agree that the stay is less critical for sovereign debtors than 
for ordinary corporations, it is important not to overstate the distinctions. 
Sovereign debtors may be vulnerable to asset seizures by determined creditors, 
for instance.S! Consider a sovereign that has a state-run airline, as many do. If 
the sovereign defaulted, creditors could seek to attach the sovereign's airplanes 
after they landed in a country that permitted such actions. In recent years, the 
sovereign finance community has watched rogne creditors act precisely this 
way, pouncing on vulnerable assets." Given the amount of money on the 
table, there is every reason to believe that creditors will continue to devise 
strategies for collecting their debts if given the opportunity. These risks 
suggest that it may be important to have at least a limited stay as part of the 
SDRM. 
Rather than eschewing the stay altogether, some commentators have called 
for an intennediate, scaled-down version of the stay." Proponents of this view 
acknowledge the need for a stay in many cases, but they argue the stay should 
not be automatic; rather, it should be conditioned OIL a majority. vote of the 
sovereign's creditors."" Under this approach, if a sovereign defaults and 
.9 [d, at 985, 
50 IMF, SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3. at 33-39 (arguing that Hotchpot rule obviates the need for .  stay. 
but leaving open the issue whethec creditors could vote to enjoin an eoforcement action that threateoed to 
undermine the reslIUcturing process), 
51 Jeff Sachs notes, for instance, that during the Russian financial crisis of the early 1990s, "individual 
creditors [were] free to haniss Russi. with legal cballenges or other forms of pressure," and lIlat Ruasia 
responded by "ma[king] side payments to particular banks, in order to avoid harassment or to cuny special 
favors." Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?, Frnnk D. Graham Lecture, 
Princeton University 13, 1 3  n.8 (Apr. 1995) (nanscript available at http://www.earlhinatitute.columbia,edu/ 
aboutldirectorfpubslintllr.pdf). 
52 The most notorious example was the strategic use of the pari passu c1ause included in most bonds by 
one Elliott Associates, a vulture investor. When Peru restructured its bonds by exchanging them for new � 
scaled-down bonds, Elliott declined to tender into the restructuring. It then persuaded a Belgian court to attach 
funds that were intended for boodbolders who had agreed to the reslIUcturing. For an analysis of the Elliott 
Slilitegy, see, for example, G. Mitu Gulad & Kenneth N. K1ee. Sovereigrr Pirocy; 56 BUS. LAW, 635 (200ty: 
53 The IMF initially cailed for something like this approach. In her April 2002 speech, Anne Krueger 
suggested that the stay be conditioned on creditor approval. although she also noted !hat it might make sense to 
impose a limited., automatic stay at the outset of the case. Krueger. supra note 3. at 10. 
5. The most recent IMF proposal recommends that the creditor-vote approach be considered, but stops 
short of fotmally proposing this strategy. See, e.g., IMF, SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3, at 9-10. In order to 
minimize the need for a stay, the IMF proposes that the SDRM include a version of the European Hotchpot 
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initiates a restructuring effort under the SDRM, and one or more creditors 
continue to pursue litigation or other enforcement strategies, another creditor 
could propose that these enforcement activities be stayed. The request for a 
stay would trigger a referendum on the proposed stay. If a majority of the 
sovereign's creditors voted in favor, the stay would go into effect; otherwise, 
creditors would remain free to attempt to collect the amounts owed to them. 
Either way, the creditors would negotiate with the sovereign over the terms of 
a restructoring plan that would then be put to a vote. 
It is easy to see why proponents of the conditional stay might [md this 
approach attractive. If the sovereign's debt structure is quite simple, for 
instance, its creditors might see no need to impose a stay. (Ideally, on this 
view, no one would even propose a stay; but if they did., the remaining 
creditors would vote it down). The prospect of eschewing stays in at least 
some cases would reduce the intrusiveness of the bankruptcy process. There 
would be no need to fight about the parameters of the stay, and. the 
restructoring process could proceed in much the same way as it does in the 
absence of an SDRM. 
Unfortunately, creditor votes are too cumbersome to ensure a timely sta¥.if .. 
one were needed.55 The vote on the stay would not take place immediately. To 
the contrary, it would take weeks and possibly several months to determine 
who all of the sovereign's creditors are, provide notice, and collect votes on a 
proposed stay. There is a serious risk that delaying the stay this long would 
amount to closing the barn door after the horses escaped. During the weeks or 
months before' the stay finally issued., vigilant creditors could try to sei� 
airplanes, or, as in the Elliott Associates case, attach funds in transit 5. 
rult; under which the payout to a creditor that manages to recover some of what it is owed before the 
restructuring is completed is redueed to the extent of this earlier payout. Ttl. at 35-38. The goal of the 
Hotchpot rule is to discourage creditors from trying to collect early. The rule is only likely to prove effective 
with creditors who might otherwise be able to obtain a limited payment outside of the restructuring. A creditoc 
that coaId obtain most 01' all of what it was owed, that is, more than the creditor expects to receive in the 
restructuring. still bas an incentive to jump the gun. 
55 See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governa="';n C/rIJpteYC' 
11, 152 U. PA. 1. REv. 917, 940-41 (2003). 
56 It is worth noting that, in bankruptcy systems that either limit or omit the stay, there is generally one or 
a small group of creditors (usually banks) who have a property intexest in the debtor's principal assets. This 
creditor (or creditors) effectively controls the process, which obviates the need for a stay. Moreover, systems 
that lack a stay are generally biased toward liquidation. The sovereign debt context does not fit either of these 
patterns. 
�'2 
• " ';", . .... 
. 
. ' ''' � .' ' .-, - 'iii � 
A 
784 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [YoL 53 
Rather than using a creditor vote, a better strategy would be to adopt a 
targeted stay, which would differentiate between ordinary litigation, on the one 
hand, and the actual seizure of assets on the other. Because ordinary litigation 
is unlikely to interfere with the restructuring process,51 a targeted stay could 
apply solely to asset seizures. Efforts to obtain assets (whether tangible assets 
or fmancial assets such as bank accounts) could be stayed, while the litigation 
process (up to the point of enforcement through asset seizure) would be 
permitted to go forward. A targeted stay of this sort would be much .less 
intrusive than a sweeping standstill, yet it would prevent the most troublesome 
interferences with an SDRM. 
An important issue raised by this limited stay concerns the status of a 
creditor who litigates to enforce its claim and obtains a judgment, but is 
prevented from enforcing its judgment by the stay. Does this creditor have an 
enforceable property interest in some or all of the sovereign debtor's attachable 
assets, such as airplanes located in the jurisdiction of the judgment? Our view 
is that any judgment obtained after the initiation of the SDRM should not give 
the creditor a property interest unless the restructuring effort later fails. A 
creditor that obtains a lien or other property interest prior to the initiation of the 
SDRM would be entitled to a priority interest in any assets covered by the lien, 
but creditors who obtained a lien during the restructuring process wonld 
continue to be treated as general unsecured creditors forl:lIe pmposes af the­
restructuring process."" Only if the SDRM proceeding were later dismissed 
would a creditor be treated as a priority creditor-and permitted to enforce its 
property interest. At least at the margin, preventing creditors from parlaying 
their postflling collection efforts into an enforceable ownership interest would 
diminish their incentive to circumvent the bankruptcy proceeding in order to 
obtain full payment of what they are owed. 
57 Sovereigns are ilifferent from ordinary corporate debtors in this regard. Whereas the managers of a 
corporate debtor are likely to be directly involved in any significant litigation involving the finn, litigation 
against a sovereign will often be bandied by different officials than the ones who participate in the SDRM. 
,. Our proposal lhus draws a sharp distinction between judgments obtained up to the point of bankruptcy, 
and those obtained during the restructuring process. U.S. corporate bankmptcy law takes this principle"lrS!"!T' 
further, and pennits 1he trustee to invalidate liens or other property interests obtained up to ninety days before 
bankruptcy pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code's preference provision. 1 1  U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000) (ninety-<lay 
reachback for ordirnuy creditors, exteeded to one year for insiders). In the interest of keeping our proposal as 
simple as possibl� we have not advocated that U.S.-style preference provisions be implemented in the 
sovereign bankruptcy contexL But our proposal could easily be ruijusted to include a preference provision if 
subsequeot experience suggests the need for this kind of reachback. 
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Let us suggest one additional alternative that could achieve many of the 
same benefits as our proposed limited stay. Rather than an automatic stay of 
asset seizures, the SDRM could include a right of appeal from judgments 
received by a creditor after the SDRM was underway. With judgments that 
threatened to undermine the restructuring process, the court could impose a 
stay; otherwise, the court would simply permit the creditor to pursue its 
remedies. 
The most obvious concern with an appeal strategy is that creditor 
enforcement activities could interfere with the sovereign's restructuring efforts 
during the period before the appeal. Even a temporary seizure of sovereign 
assets could have substantial untoward effects. A second, quite different 
concern is that the appellate process seems to put the court in the awkward 
position of passing judgment on the courts of the country where the assets are 
located. An important mitigating factor with respect to the sovereignty 
concern is that the SDRM court would not need to address the merits of the 
decision made by a nation's judicial system. Rather than second-guessing the 
validity of the decision in question, the SDRM court would simply be 
determining whether a stay is necessary to protect the restructuring process. 
Overall, we can imagine an SDRM working effectively even without a 
formal stay. The stay (with the exception of the need for some kin4 of-cap.ital. 
controls, as we discuss briefly below) is not as essential as the other provisions 
we will be discussing, such as interim financing. Ideally, however, the SDRM­
would include at least a limited stay. A stay on asset seizures would prevent 
the kinds of interventions by rogue creditors that have interfered with several 
restructuring effOllts in recent years. Providing for an appeal from judgments 
that threatened to interfere with the restructure might have a similar effect. 
Throughout this discussion, we have focused on traditional collection 
activities by creditors. Before moving on, we should note that sovereign 
debtors face another, somewhat analogous threat as well: the risk of a run on 
the sovereign's currency. In the face of a debt crisis, investors may withdraw 
their money from the troubled nation, which can then magnify the sovereign's 
fiscal crisis. The threat of a currency crisis can sometimes be addressed by 
capital controls, which function somewhat like the more traditional stay we 
have described." Capital controls, however, are also fraught with difficulties. 
59 For a discussion of currency runs. and an argument that capital controls are an essential response. see. 
for example, Sachs, supra note 51, at 10 (arguing that "a temporary peg of the exchange rate, backed by 
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In the past, they have often been evaded, and it is very difficult to prevent 
currency runs from occurring as soon as the controls are lifted. Because 
capital controls are beyond the scope of our inquiry-which concerns the 
structure of an international bankruptcy framework-we do not take a position 
on whether or how capital controls could be used to protect against the risk of 
currency runs. But it is important to note both that capital controls are another 
significant issue when sovereigus face a debt crisis, and that capital controls 
could be implemented in tandem with the sovereign bankruptcy framewerk we 
propose. 
B. A Note on Initiation: Should Involuntary Bankruptcy Be Permitted? 
All of the existing sovereign bankruptcy proposals either assume or 
explicitly state that the sovereign debtor should be the one to initiate the 
restructuring process.'" Like the most closely analogous regime, the U.S. 
provisions providing for municipal bankruptcy, and unlike the corporate 
bankruptcy laws of most nations, these proposals would not permit a sovereign 
debtor' s  creditors to trigger the restructuring process involuntarily. This 
voluntary-only limitation is grounded in sovereignty concerns. Advocates of 
the voluntary-only approach point out that the private creditors' ability to 
throw a sovereign debtor into bankruptcy could be seen as interfering with the 
sovereign's autonomy:' They also worry that the sovereign's creditors might 
use involuntary bankruptcy strategically, invoking bankruptcy for political 
rather than economic reasons. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, there is greater merit in recommending 
involuntary bankruptcy than is often appreciated. Under a voluntary-only 
regime, sovereigns may me for bankruptcy much later than the optimal time. 
This seems counterintuitive, because commentators often identify moral 
hazard-the concern that sovereigns will invoke the SDRM opportunistically 
-as an important downside of sovereign bankruptcy. In practice, however, 
sovereigns seem to default too late, not too early, due both to the reputational 
consequences of default, and to their ability to issue new debt, which dilutes 
the existing stock of outstanding debt and postpones the day of reckoning. 
Creditor initiation could serve as a corrective, counteracting both the 
reputational and the overborrowing concerns. Creditor initiation would 
adequa!e foreign exchange reserves, can overcome the problem of self-fulfilling currency flight," but thai: 
long-tenn use of fixed exchange rates is futile). 
60 See, e.g., Schwarcz. supra note 1� at 982. 61 [d. 
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alleviate the sovereign' s  reputational concerns by suggesting that the filing 
really was necessary-that is, the sovereign was not trying to use bankruptcy 
opportunistically.
62 
With respect to overborrowing, involuntary initiation 
would provide a mechanism for creditors to block new debt issues that threaten 
to dilute their debt. In effect, involuntary initiation could serve as a substitute 
for dependable enforcement of priorities outside of the SDRM. Not only 
would this ensure a more timely initiation of the SDRM, but, by protecting 
creditors' priorities, it also could significantly enhance the functiQning of 
sovereign credit markets ex ante. 
Now, an obvious concern with creditor initiation is that one or a small 
group of rogne creditors might initiate the SDRM opportunistically. The 
simplest solution is to require that a critical mass of creditors sign on to any 
involuntary SDRM petition. If the provision included a reqnirernent that at 
least five percent of the sovereign's creditors participate in any petition, the 
risk of frivolous filings would largely disappear.·3 The requirement could be 
further refined by excluding creditors whose debts are not yet in default from 
participating in the involuntary petition. 
Whether sovereign debtors would agree to an SDRM that could be invoked 
involuntarily, by the sovereign's creditors, is of course an open question. It is 
important to note, in this regard, that sovereigns are already subject to suit in 
foreign courts, and have been since they began waiving sovereign immunity in 
the 1970s.64 Moreover, creditor initiation would help to offset the perception 
that sovereign bankruptcy is too lenient on sovereign debtors. In short, from 
the perspective of both creditors and sovereign debtors, involuntary bankruptcy 
makes much more sense than is generally thought. 
62 We do not·want to overstate this argument. It is certainty possible that a sovereign would collude with 
some of its creditors in connection with an involuntary bankruptcy filing, But we think this is relatively 
unlikely. given the consequences of a filing. 
63 Although U.S. bankruptcy law has a much more lenient requirement for involuntary petitiens, see 1 1  . 
U.S.c. § 303(b) (requiring tbree creditors with . total of $11 ,625 in unsecured claiIru;), the kind of percentage 
requirement we propose is similar to the rules for creditor initiation under other nations' corporate bankruptcy 
Jaws. See, e.g., LaPorta et al., supra note 47, at 1 135 (listing petition requirements). 
64 See. e.g .• Jeremy Bulow, First World Governments and Third World Debt: A Bankmptcy Court fur 
Sovereign Lending?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 2002:1, at 229 (William C. Brainard & George 
L. Perry eds., 2003) (arguing for a reinstatement of sovereigo i!)lIllunity). 
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IV. CLASSIFICATION AND VOTING 
Besides helping to resolve collective action problems among creditors, the 
other important function of bankruptcy is to enforce priority of senior claims 
over junior ones. This is also an important potential role for the SDRM. It is 
even more so given that it is cnrrently very difficult to enforce a priority claim 
on a sovereign. With the exception of a small fraction of privileged claims, 
issued mostly by public entities separate from the sovereign, it is generally 
impossible for a private creditor to enforce a priority payment. Even if a 
subordination clause were included in a sovereign bond issue, it would be 
essentially unenforceable. As a result, enforcement of absolute priority under 
the SDRM may have even more inrportant effects than enforcement of priority 65 under corporate bankruptcy. 
We begin our discussion of classification and enforcement of absolute 
priority with ' an  illustrative example showing how, in the absence of any 
enforcement of priority, early creditors are exposed to a risk of dilution of their 
claim by subsequent debt issues of the sovereign. The example shows how the 
possibility of dilution gives rise to a "soft budget constrainC66 for the 
sovereign, delayed debt restructuring, overborrowing, and higher costs of debt. 
A. Example: Debt Dilution and Overborrowing 
Consider -the following situation involving a sovereign borrower. The 
country borrows 100 to undertake an inftastructure investment in year t=O. In 
normal circumstances this investment is expected to produce a yearly flow 
return of 20 in present-discounted (tax) revenues over a period of ten years, 
starting in year t=1. In other words, the cumulative present-discounted return 
over the ten years is 200. But, in the event of a crisis, an adverse 
65 Moreover. to the extent there are benefits to permitting at least modest deviations from absolute 
priority, these benefits are already embedded in the sovereign deb' conteXt. Corporate bankruptcy scholars 
have pointed out that Chapter I I 's deviations from absolute priority. and the fact that managers continue to run 
the business in bankruptcy. may dampen the incentive to take excessive risks on the eve of bankruptcy. See, 
e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert R Scott, On the Nature of the Creditors' Bankruptcy: An Essay on 
'Bankruprcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 169·74 (1989). Because sovereigns 
cannot be liquidated, and sovereign bankroptcy will no' displace the leadership of a country, the benefits (and 
risks) of a usoft landing" are built into the SDRM process. As a result, it makes sense for the sovereign 
bankruptcy framew<crl< itself to focus on the goal of limiting any further deviations from absolute priority. 
66 The tenn "soft budget constraint" has been coined by Janos Krn:nai to describe the bailouts of loss· 
making state-owned enterprises in centrally planned economies. See Janos Koma.i. "Hard" and "Soft" 
Budget Constraint. 25 AcrA OECONOMICA 231 (1980). 
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macroeconomic shock, a currency attack, or a political crisis, the maximum 
present-discounted yearly revenues that can be transferred to creditors are 
expected to drop to 5. We shall take it that this negative shock may occnr in 
year t= 1. If it arises it reduces the sovereign's revenues in year t= 1 and all 
remaining years. Moreover, we shall suppose that these revenues are obtained 
only if in the event of a crisis the debtor undertakes prompt corrective action 
by restructuring its outstanding debt obligations immediately. If the sovereign 
postpones restructuring, then the present-discounted yearly revenues will only 
be 4 over the next ten periods. 
The idea here is that if prompt restructuring is accompanied by immediate 
new infrastructure investments or more fiscal austerity measures, they will 
enhance the sovereign's capacity to repay its debts. However, if restructuring 
is delayed, these measures or new investments will also be delayed, leading to 
lower potential repayments over a decade. 
For simplicity we shall suppose that a negative shock is expected to hit the 
sovereign in year t=1 with a 50% probability. Consider first the situation 
where the sovereign can borrow only from one source: a single large, risk­
neutral lender issuing a single long-term debt claim. This lender is willing to 
lend as long as it expects to break even. Under prompt corrective action, this 
lender can expect to get a present-value return of 50 in the event of a negative 
shock, so that the minimum face value of the debt at which the lender can 
expect to break even at the time of issuance will be Do=150, with a specified 
total yearly repayment of 15  over the 1O-year period. Indeed, with probability 
0.5 the sovereign will not be hit by an adverse shock, the lendeT- will ·then 
receive a flow-return of 15 over 10 periods amounting to a present-discounted 
value of 150. But with probability 0.5 a bad shock hits the sovereign, the 
debtor will be unable to meet the flow interest payments of 15. 
What happens then? Since there is only one lender to whom the sovereign 
can turn, the sovereign is unable to raise new funds from other sources in an 
attempt to meet the outstanding debt obligations to the lender. The only option 
open to the sovereign then is to try to reschedule or roll over the lender's debt 
obligation. But this is a decision for the lender to make. If the lender is 
unwilling to roll over the debt the sovereign will be forced to default. In other 
words, the sovereign will be in the hands of the lender and will be forced to 
restructure its fiscal position and outstanding debt promptly when an adverse 
macroeconomic shock occurs. The lender will agree to a debt reduction as 
, ' ... . �}.- ---" .," . -'w. 
, , 
;rt. �" .,, �j 
, if.;.; 
0 '  
790 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53 
long as the sovereign commits
' 
to undertaking the desired corrective actions 
and agrees to repay a yearly payment of 5 over the 10 periods. 
These repayments add up to a total present-discounted repayment of 50. 
Thus, in expected terms the lender will get a total repayment of [0.5 x 150 + 
0.5 x 50]=100, just enough to cover the initial outlay of 100. 
Thus, in the presence of a single lender the sovereign can raise 100 by 
issuing a total debt with face value of 150 and yearly repayments of 15: The 
sovereign faces a "hard budget constraint,,67 in the sense that it is unable to 
borrow itself out of a crisis and thereby delay the required restructuring. When 
a crisis occurs in year t= 1, the sovereign is either forced to default or to 
promptly restructure its debts. 
But when the sovereign can raise new funds from other creditors and 
absolute priority is not enforced, it no longer faces a hard budget constraint. 
To see this, suppose that there is another creditor to which the sovereign can 
turn in year t=1 . Suppose in addition that the sovereign government always 
prefers to delay restructuring if it can. This may be the case, for example, if a 
new administration is taking office every year and there are net private costs 
involved for the administration in place in undertaking a major fiscal 
restructuring effort. Then each administration in office would prefer to have a 
later administration deal with the problem. Although incentives for procrasti­
nation are put in a very stark way in this example, this is hardly an unrealistic 
description of the behavior of many governments that have let their debt 
balloon rather than taking prompt corrective action in response to an adverse 
economic shock. 
When there is a single potential lender available, it is not feasible to delay 
the restructuring, as we have explained above. It has to be dealt with 
immediately. In other words, the single lender acts as a commitment device 
for fiscal discipline. But when the sovereign can borrow from another source 
(at competitive terms) and priority is not enforced, then the sovereign may well 
be able to borrow itself out of the crisis and postpone restructuring. As a 
result, the low cost of borrowing under a single exclusive lending relationship 
is no longer obtainable. 
61 A «harrl" budget constraint is the constraint a borrower- faces when there are no bailouts or other 
fonns of subsidized lending. See iii. 
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To see this, suppose by contradiction that a naIve initial lender is willing to 
lend l00 in-yeM·t",t:hiNlx-Ghange for a face value claim of 150, with a required 
flow repayment of 15  over 10 periods. Further, consider what the sovereign 
would do in response to an adverse shock in year t=1 when no subordination 
' .  priorities' or uther 'covenant protections are enforceable in international debt 
markets, as is currently the case. Then, in the event of a bad shock in year t=l, 
the sovereign will be able to postpone corrective action for at least one period 
by issuing new debt, which dilutes the old outstanding debt. 
To be able to meet the required debt repayment of 15 in year t=1 following 
an adverse shock, the sovereign needs to raise 1 1  from another source. Indeed, 
if the sovereign fails to restructure and take prompt corrective action it will 
generate yearly revenues of at most 4. 
What is the face value of this new debt? Put differently, how much is a 
. new ' debt claim of DN with· flow Tepayment � over 9 periods worth in the 
market? Under current pari passu rules the new debt will receive a fraction [� 
l(dN+ 15)] of the yearly flow revenue of 4 following restructuring in period t = 
2. Therefore, the promised new repayment � is worth: 
4 x [� /(�+ 15)] = [4� I(�+ 15)]. 
The sovereign, therefore only needs to set � at a level such that 
9 x [� /(�+ 15)] = 11 .  
This figure is  the amount of new funds the sovereign needs to raise to be 
able to meet its old debt obligations and postpone corrective action until the 
next period. In sum, any new debt with a promised yearly repayment of � = 
33/5 = 6.6 will do the trick! 
A central conclusion of this example is that this new debt issue involves a 
significant dilution of the value of the old debt claim. Instead of receiving a 
.- flow repayment of 5 ·over 10 periods in the event of a bad shock the initial 
lender now receives at most 15 in year t=1 (as the sovereign fully meets the 
required debt repayment in an attempt to postpone the painful debt 
restructuring) plus 25 (that is, 9 x 4 - 1 1) in the subsequent 9 years. That is a 
total of 40 instead of the previous 50 (when there was no dilution and prompt 
corrective action). 
How much does this risk of dilution affect the cost of borrowing of the 
sovereign when dilution is anticipated at .t=O? To be able to answer this 
'1;' 
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question one needs to determine the sovereign's total capacity to raise new 
debt in the event of a negative shock. For any initial outstanding debt Do the 
sovereign will be able to raise at most 40 if the-new lenders lend On fair terms, 
given that restructuring does not occur in year t=1. In an attempt to avoid 
default and thus postpone restructuring as much as possible the sovereign will 
actually pay out this entire amonnt to the old lender. 
Therefore, when overborrowing is expected in response to an adverse 
shock, which then dilutes outstanding debt, the faCe value of the original debt 
must increase from Do=150 (with no dilution) to Do=I60. Indeed, by holding a 
debt claim of Do=l60, with total yearly repayments of 16 over a to-year . 
period, the initial lender can hope to get: 
0.5 x 160 + 0.5 x 40 = 100. 
Thus, when lending cannot be excluded, the sovereign faces a higher cost 
of capital and must promise a total present value of repayments of Do=l60 
(instead of Do=150) to be able to raise 100. The efficient outcome with no 
overborrowing would be attainable if abs�priority were enforced. Indeed, 
if the initial lender had priority over new lenders, then the sovereign could not 
turn to new lenders to raise more funds. These- junior-lenders would not be 
able to get any repayment following an adverse shock and would therefore be 
unwilling to lend. 
This example starkly illustrates our main argument that the lack of 
enforcement of absolute priority results in a higher cost of borrowing for the 
sovereign. It also illustrates how this lack. of eHforcemeIi.t of absohrte ptiOlity 
may result in overborrowing and inefficiently delayed restructuring. 
As bad as the outcome in the absence of absolute priority is in this 
example, it is still not the worst possible outcome. Indeed, we have only 
allowed for overborrowing in the event of a negative shock. But incentives to 
overborrow are present even when no negative shock occurs. Although in 
theory the sovereign would always want to issue new debt and dilute all 
outstanding debt, in our example it is not very plausible that sovereigns wouh:t 
pursue a systematic dilution policy with such guile. This is why we have only 
allowed for such lending in the event of a bad shock. 
Under the current international fmancial architecture, the ouly lender that 
imposes discipline on sovereigns and induces them to undertake painful 
corrective measures to redress their financial health is the tMfi. But the IMF is 
I 
i 
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in a weak: position to effectively fulfill this role, as has been argued in many 
places and is widely recognized:' 
Another important inefficiency that may result from the absence of legal 
enforcement of absolute priority is that lenders may attempt to obtain de facto 
priority repayment by issuing "dangerous" debt with short maturity and highly · 
dispersed claimholders, which expose the sovereign to both a higher risk of a 
debt crisis and higher restructuring costs." Thus, as has.., b.een _widely . 
recognized by legal scholars of corporate bankruptcy, enforcement of absolute 
priority is likely to provide a major benefit in sovereign debt markets,'O and the 
introduction of the SDRM provides an ideal opportunity to lay the foundations 
of a new legal regime of sovereign debt priorities. The question, however, is 
how to achieve this. 
B. Classification, Voting, and the First-in-Time Principle 
To determine how best to protect creditors' priorities in the sovereign debt 
context, it is natural to first briefly enquire how priority is enfurced for· 
corporate debt. An important and widely used way of guaranteeing priority for 
corporate debt in liquidation is to secure a loan with collateral and to perfect 
the security." In such a case, the secured creditor becomes the sole owner of 
the collateral in liquidation. Unfortunately, this option is generally unavailitble­
for sovereign debt. 
Another less commonly used option is to insert a subordination clause in 
the debt contract requiring all subsequent debt to be subordinated. . 'fhe 
difficulty with this approach lies in the enforcement of this subordination 
clause, as it contractually binds only the creditor and debtor who sign the 
contract. Should the debtor issue future debt with higher or equal priority 
without the knowledge of the initial lender and should the debtor go bankrupt, 
the initial lender may be unable to enforce its priority claim. To be able to 
effectively enforce a subordination clause, the initial lender then needs to 
68 See GROUP OF TEN. THE REsOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN L1QlJ1DITY CRISES (1996), available at http:// 
www,bis,org/publlgten03,pdf; PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHlTEcruRE: WHAT'S 
NEW? WHAT's MJSSJNG' (2001). 
69 For discussion of this response, and the inefficiencies jt creates, see Bolton & Jeanne, supra note 15. 70 For a recent review of the benefits of absolute priority and the effects of deviation from it.in the 
corporate context. see Bebchuk. supm note 9. 
71 Perfected property interests, including security interests in personal property and mortgages on real 
estare, are given priority in bankruptcy as to the collateral put'&!an( to 1 1  US.c. § 725 (2000). 
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continuously monitor the debtor and stop the debtor from issuing new equal or 
higher priority debt by filing an injunction. 
In Chapter 1 1, secured creditors' actions to appropriate their collateralized 72 assets are stayed. Although commentators have long suspected that secured 
creditors are not fully protected in Chapter 1 1 ,  the bankruptcy laws provide a 
variety of protections designed to ensure that secured creditors' priority is 
respected.73 In the Chapter 1 1  plan confirmation process, absolute priority is 
enforced by a combination of three elements: (1) classification of secured and 
unsecured creditors in separate classes,74 (2) veto power of each class over the 
proposed restructuring plan,75 and (3) the "best rrrterest" and "cramdown" 
rules.76 
Each of these elements is essential to enforce absolute priority. To see why 
classification by priority together with a unanimity requirement across classes 
is necessary to enforce absolute priority, consider the hypothetical rule under 
which only a (super)majority requirement across classes is needed to approve a 
plan. It is easy to see that in this case the debtor" who has agenda-setting 
power at least during the first 1 20 days of the bankruptcy case,71 can single out 
�ne -er 'Several classes for special unfair treatment and hope to win, approval 
from the other classes. By playing one class against another, the debtor may 
thus be lIble to secure approval by the required majority of classes of a plan 
that is very favorable to the debtor. But, worst of all, in the absence of any 
other protection the debtor can get a plan approved which does not respect the 
priority ranking of the claims in any systematic way. Thus, in the absence of a 
unanimity rule across classes, basic creditor protections' would be undermined 
by classification, because any form of classification would permit deviations 
72 Id. § 362(a). 
73 See, e.g., id. § 362(d)(l) (creditor entitled to relief if it lacks "adequate protection"). 74 !d. § 1 122 (requiring classification of claims and interests). 
75 The veto power of each class stems from the fact that a consensual reorganization plan cannot be 
confirmed unless the proper majorities of every class approve the plan. See id. § 1 129(a)(8) (requiring 
approval by all classes). 
76 Voder § 1l29(a)(7), the "best inrerest of the creditors " rule, a plan can only be confirmed if every 
dissenting creditor or equity holder will receive at least as much as they would receive in a liquidation. The 
"cramdown" rule comes into play if all of the requirements for a consensual reorganization under § 1 129(a) 
are met except § 1 129(.)(8), the requirement that every class approve the plan. IT one or more classes dissent, 
the plan can be confirmed nonconsensually-as a "cramdown··-under § 1 129(b) if. among other things, it 
satisfies the absolute priority rule with respect to every dissenting class. See id. § 1 129(a)-(b). These rules are 
discussed in more detail infra. See also David A. Skeel. lr.� The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in 
Chapter 11 Reorganizalian Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461 (1992) (explaining and analyzing the Chaprer 1 1  voting 
process). 77 See 11 V.S.c. § 1121 (giving the debtor-in-possession a IZO-day "exclusivity period"). 
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from equal treatment among all creditors and thus make it easier for a majority 
0f=editors to &�te a�ority. 
Under the unanimity requirement. each class, and in particular, each class 
of secured debt holtlers, has at least the basic protection given by their veto 
power. Note, however, that this protection by itself does not guarantee 
enforcement of absolute priority. Indeed, to the extent that junior classes also 
have a veto ·right they can block any restructuring agreement which is not to 
their liking, even if under a strict enforcement of absolute priority they should 
not be entitled to anything. In other words, junior creditor classes (and 
shareholders) also sit around the bargaining table and are as criticill as· any 
other class in securing an agreement. They are therefore able to extract some 
concessions in the restructuring negotiatious and thereby may violate the 
priority ranking of claims. 
This is wby the third element Df the cramdown option and best interest 
protection is essential Under the cramdown, the court can enforce a 
restructuring plan even if a junior class opposes it, if the court finds.k� to 
be "fair and equitable," which includes a requirement that the plan satisfy the 
absolute priority rule with respect to any dissenting class.71l That i:>; tfte court 
can approve the plan if it finds either that the dissenting junior class is paid in 
full, or that no lower priority class will receive anything under the. plan.. ..The. . 
best interest rule provides another protection. If the reorganization plan gives 
less to a class than it would get under liqnidation, a un� agreemeut 
among the creditors in the class is required for the class to approve the plan.'" 
The best interest protection and the threat of a cramdown ate essential for 
senior creditors to ensure that the restructuring agreement does not deviate too 
much from absolute priority. While courts have been reluctant to use a 
cramdown in the past,'" it has become a much more common practice in recent 
years. Accordingly, deviations from absolute priority are now significantly 
smaller." 
l' ld, § 1129(e). 
19 ld. § 1129(a)(7). Unanimity would be required because any creditor in the class can J1Iise an objeCtion 
alleging that it is not receiving as much as in a liquidation. 
80 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPnclci & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, t'ulilicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990) (noting courts' 
and banlcruptcy lawyers' reluctance to nse cramdown). 
81 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. RaslDllSsen, Chapter I I at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673, 
692 (2003) (noting thar �equityholders typically get wiped out" ;"current bankruptcy cases). 
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Interestingly, one could envision an extreme form of cramdown procedure, 
where the court determines by absolute priority the value of the reorganized 
firm and the allocation of claims on the reorganized firm to creditors. Under 
such a procedure, there would in principle be no need for a cumbersome 
classification of claims and a unanimity rule among classes. However, as one 
can easily imagine, such a procedure is likely to put too heavy a burden on the 
court's ability to value a reorganized firm. The court is also likely to lack the 
information required to reliably classify claims by priority. The debtor is in a 
much better position to determine which claims should be classified together in 
a separate class. This is presumably why the law gives discretion to the debtor, 
within limits, to classify similar claims together."" 
Our proposal for enforcement of absolute priority under the SDRM mirrors 
some of the key elements of Chapter 1 1  by taking into account the specific 
practical difficulties related to sovereign debt. More so than for firms, judges 
--are unlikely {o have the expertise to make a reliable determination as to the 
sustainability of a sovereign's debt. The judge might seek the expert opinion 
of the IMP, but the IMP's evaluation of the levet of debt that is likely to be 
sustainable may be seen as politically biased. Creditors and the debtor are 
likely to also retain experts and to produce widely cdiffering estimates, which 
may not facilitate the judge's task. 
This is why we propose to leave the determination of what is a reasonable 
reduction-of a sovereign's overall indebtedness to the collective decision of the 
creditors in a two-step procedure. Once all debt claims have been identified 
and classified into priority classes or separate classes involving a distinctive 
common interest (like trade credit), we propose to have the following two 
steps: 
(1) First, the sovereign puts an overall debt reduction proposal to a vote of 
all creditors in a single class, voting in proportion to their individual debt 
holdings. The majority rule would be specified in such a way as to fairly 
balance creditor and debtor interests. Although we will argne for a simple 
majority approach below, a two-thirds majority may seem reasonable, or even 
.2 I I  U.S.C. § 1 122 (permitting similar claims to be classified in !be same class). Admitredly, !be 
process of enforcing absolute priority under Otapter I I  is not perfect. Severn! ingenious alternative procedures 
have been proposed to improve on current practice but they have not yet been tested. See, e.g .. Philippe 
Aghion et aI.. The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L EcON. & ORo. 523 (1992) (auction involving 
options); Lucian A. BeIx:huk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 HARv. L REv. 775 (1988) 
(optioll&-based altemative to Chapter 1 1). 
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the seventy-five percent requirement used in most CACs for sovereign debt 
issue in London. 83 
(2) Once a debt reduction has . been agreed on, the sovereign would 
propose a reorganization plan specifying the treatment of each class of claims. 
Concretely, all creditor classes would vote on the proposed distribution-cat' ·  
claims to the different classes. As under Chapter 1 1, each class would require 
a supermajority, say of two-thirds, of the face value of the total debt in the 
class, and unanimity among the classes would be required. Should one class 
vote against the proposed allocation of new claims then, as in Chapter 1 1, a 
cramdown could be enforced by allocating claims directly in order of absolute 
priority. 
The first step would serve the purpose of determining a sustainable level of 
debt for the sovereign and solve the collective action problem among creditors. 
The second step would be directed toward the enforcement of absolute priority. 
A number of obvious questions arise concerning this scheme. We discuss each 
one in detail below. 
(a) How will creditors vote? A creditor's vote will depend to a large 
extent on how high in the priority ranking the creditor's claim is. If the claim 
is senior, then the creditor would be in favor of a significant haircut, since the 
cost of the haircut would fall primarily on the more junior debt classes ana 
since the new claim is more likely to be repaid in full if the sovereign's 
reorganized debt burden is lower. By the same logic, a junior claimholder 
would be opposed to significant haircuts. For junior claims, the incentive is to 
maintain the existing level of debt and "gamble for resurrection." Thus, there 
will be a "pivotal" creditor or creditor class, which will decide the outcome." 
Any proposed haircut that is higher than what the pivotal creditor wants will be 
defeated in a vote, and any haircut that is lower will be approved. The 
sovereign will then obviously propose the highest possible haircut that is 
acceptable to the pivotal creditor. 
One potential concern with our proposed two-step procedure is that if a 
large fraction of creditors are junior clairnholders they will be able to block any 
reasonable haircut. Our restructoring procedure would then result in too little 
83 We discuss the extent to which sovereigns should be permitted to tailor the sovereign bankruptcy 
framework in detail infra Part VII. Tailoring is clearly appropriate in the context of specific voting rules. 
84 For an argument that Chapter 1 1  's voting rules have this effect, see Skeel, supra note 76, at 480 n.69 
(analogizing the effect to the predictions of median voter theory). 
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debt reduction. The most extreme such situation would be one where all 
creditors are junior creditors and would therefore be required to give up some 
of their debt claims. In such a situation, the creditors would only agree to a 
haircut that is no greater than what they would agree to in a workout. Such a 
-haircut might be too small for the reasons we have already evoked and it might 
be desirable to build an incentive for juuior creditorS"to accept greater fiaircuts 
into the restructuring procedure. One way of building in such an inceutive 
might be to give higher priority status and greater protection against default to 
the restructuredjuuior debt. Alternatively, in situations where there are several 
different priority classes, it might be desirable to reduce the power of junior 
creditors by using a simple majority voting rule in the first round, rather than 
two-thirds or seventy-five percent. 
(b) What happens when a proposed haircut is rejected in a vote of all 
creditors? In the event of a negative vote in the first round, it is reasonably 
straightforward to determine what should be done next. There are two options. 
One is to terminate the restructuring procedure and force the sovereign and 
creditors to find a restructuring agreement outside the 'SDRM through a 
workout. The other is to let the sovereign andlor creditors put a new haircut to 
a vote. The first option wonld serve as a threat to the sovereign to avoid 
excessively high haircuts. It would also offer added protection to creditors, 
who could always collectively guarantee that- debt restmetHfmg " take place - ­
outside the SDRM by voting down any restructuring proposal. The second 
option is clearly more debtor-friendly. It would be justified if debt ­
restructuring outside the SDRM is seen to result in too little debt forgiveness. 
Which of these two options is more desirable requires a careful balancing of 
creditor and debtor interests, which we are not in a position to do. 
(c) What happens when a proposed allocation of new claims to creditors 
is rejected by one or more classes in the second round? Here again one could 
envision one -or  multiple new proposals by the debtor or creditors being pllt to 
a vote. As in Chapter 1 1 ,  however, eventually this process has to end. We 
propose that the judges supervising the restructuring proceedings may decide 
at their own discretion or at the request of a creditor class to initiate a 
cramdown procedure, whereby the newly reduced stock of debt is allocated on 
an absolute priority basis. 
(d) How is priority determined and how are claims classified? This is by 
far the most important and difficult issue, and it demands a somewhat more 
detailed discussion than the ones we have just covered. Two points require 
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examination. The first one is how the contracting parties can defme a priority 
claim. The second is how the different claims are classified. Who has the 
authority to classify and what should be the underlying principles? 
Most lending to sovereigns can only be in the form of unsecured debt." 
Thus, specifying a separate priority class for only secured debt and for debt 
issued by mnltilateral institutions would provide no more than a very limited 
form of priority enforcement. To enable enforcement of a more 
comprehensive form of absolute priority structure and to limit dilution of ' 
outstanding debt by new debt as much as possible, we would favor a <'first-in­
time" rule for unsecured debt. Such a rule would guarantee repayment of debt · 
issued earlier over debt issued later and would come closest to the ideal of 
guaranteeing maximum protection against dilutiou through overborrowing, as 
has been recognized by legal and finance scholars.'" Concretely, the way this 
rule would work is that when a sovereign files for debt restructuring under the 
SDRM, all unsecured debts would be classified by date of issue and earlier 
issues would have higher priority over later issues. 
The priority scheme we envision would operate as a default rule that could 
be altered by contract. Subordination agreements between classes of creditors. 
would be enforced In theory, a sovereign that was concerned about the 
possibility of a subsequent liquidity crisis could include a provision giving it 
the right to issue a specific amount of priority debt in each of its contracts with 
current creditors." 
If there are many different issues it may be impractical to have a separate 
class for every date at which an issue was made. To avoid the creation of too 
many classes, it may then be desirable to require that each class be of a 
minimum size in value relative to the total value of outstanding debt. 
Alternatively, another way of limiting the number of classes may be to lump 
issues within any given fiscal year together in a single class. 
85 Jeromin Zettehneyer, Int'l Monetary Fund, The Case for an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign 
Debt (Sept. 29. 20(3) (unpublisbed working paper, on file with authors). 
86 See EuGENE F. FAMA & MEl<rON H. MI!.LER, T!!ET!lEoRY OFFINANCE 150-52 (1972); AlanSchwam; 
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1981); 
Clifford w. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Band Covenants, 7 J, 
FIN. EcoN. 117 (1979); Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority 
Rules. I I  BEU.J. ECON. 550 (1980). 
fIT M Anna Gelpern nores, this would require foresight and the political will to defer borrowing. Anna 
Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart!or Sovereign Restructuri.l'gs, 53 EMORyL.J. 11 19. 1 149 (2004). 
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There are two other concerns with the first-in-time rule. First, it may 
impose substantial risk on new lenders, because they would inevitably be at the 
bottom of the queue unless they are able to obtain some form of security or 
other privilege. Of course, exposing new lenders to this risk is desirable to the 
extent that it forces new lenders to make the economically efficient lending 
decision: whether to lend the marginal dollar or cut the sovereign off from any 
new lending given that its existing stock of debt has grown too large. 
However, inefficiencies may arise if it is difficult for the new lenders to 
determine exactly how indebted the sovereign is. ILthe sovereign can easily 
hide or misrepresent its total indebtedness, new lenders may be excessively 
reluctant to extend a loan for fear of discovering after the fact that the 
sovereign's stock of debt is much higher than anticipated. Such an inefficiency 
can be considerably reduced if a global clearinghouse were established to keep 
a public record of all outstanding sovereign debt, as was proposed at the 
Monterrey Summit in 2002 by Norway and the Ford Foundatiqn." With such a 
clearinghouse it would be a simple matter for a new lender to monitor a 
_ sovereign's �tanding debt and to make an efficient lending decision under a 
first-in-time rule. 
The other concern with the first-in-time rule is that new lenders may try to 
leapfrog the priority ranking by either insisting on a privileged claim or by 
shortening the maturity of their loan so as to be paid- back before the other 
older debt. This is unlikely to be a major problem, because secured lending is 
generally difficult to obtain. Also, new short:maturity debt ouly involves a 
limited form of dilution of outstanding debt. Should creditors be concerned by 
this form of dilution, they could in principle get protection through covenants 
specifying lower limits on the maturity of new debt issues. With the exception 
of trade credit, which generally can only be of very short maturity, it may be 
desirable to enforce such covenants. Again, enforcement of such covenants 
would be considerably facilitated by the existence of a global clearinghouse. 
This brings us to our second point on classification of claims into different 
. classes. Classification of claims by priority is easy to understand in theory but 
difficult to implement in practice. What is worse, there are likely to be 
important additional considerations besides priority specific to sovereign debt. 
"For example; it seems reasonable to think of Paris Club debt as a separate 
88 See l3ARBARA SAMUELS. II. S"ffiENG'I1lE>.'lNG lNFoRMATION AND ANAL YSlS IN 1HE GLoBAL FlNANClAL 
SYSTEM: A CoNCRETE SET OF PROPOSALS. U.N. Doc. STIESAI2OO2IDP23 (UN. Dep't of Boon. & Soc. 
Affair.<. Discussion Paper No. 23, 2002), available at http://www.un.orgfesa/esa02dp23.pdf; The Global 
Information Clearinghouse, at http://globalclearinghouse.org (last updated Sept. 15. 20(3). 
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class. Similarly, multilateral debt and trade credit may belong to a separate 
class. One might also argne that bank loans ought to be classified separately 
from mark-to-market bond issues. Within the category of sovereign bonds a 
case could be made for classifying the bonds by the financial center where they 
were issued. Indeed, these centers may represent different clienteles with 
different economic interests. 
. 
To the extent that the treasury department of the sovereign government is 
likely to have the most detailed knowledge of the country's debt structure and 
the iuner worlting of the different credit markets they tap, it seems reasonable 
to leave the debtor discretion over classification, but to constrain the debtor's 
freedom to classify by reqniring that only similar claims can be classified 
within the same class. If there is sufficient ambignity about how similar claims 
must be to belong to a given class and· if creditors are concerned that the debtor 
is "gerrymandering," then it should be possible for the creditors to prevent 
such classification, ex ante by including a covenant in the cootract that 
precludes claims that are considered to be different from being classified with 
other types of debt, and ex post by appealing the debtor�s proposed 
classification. 
(e) What should be the priority and maturity structure of the new claims? 
The discussion so far has been cast in terms of substituting a comWex.�sting. 
maturity and priority debt structure with a single new type of claim on the 
sovereign. While debt restructuring is often an opportunity to. Eoos-iderably 
simplify the existing debt structure, it is clearly overly simplistic to think of 
substituting a single new type of claim for all the different types of claims. 
Onr proposal does not depend in any way on such a radical restructuring. 
Indeed, when it comes to the second stage of allocating new debt claims to the 
different classes it may be helpful to think of a swap of old claims for new 
claims of a similar type, with only possibly a reduced face value and an 
extended maturity. 
V. lNTE.RIM FINANCING FOR TIlE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS 
Having discussed the need for a stay and how the sovereign bankruptcy 
voting rules should be structured, we turn now to the issue of interim 
financing. Once again, corporate bankruptcy experience will provide several 
useful analogies as we develop a framework for the sovereign bankruptcy 
context. 
I 
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For corporate debtors, access to interim fmancing is a crucial determinant 
of the outcome of the restructuring process. Corporate debtors are nearly 
always starved for cash when they me for banKruptcy. Both intuition and 
empirical evidence suggest that those with access to interim fmancing are 
much more likely to reorganize than those that lack this access.8• In the United 
States, lawmakers have provided sweeping protections for interim lenders in 
order to facilitate this fmancing. Under § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
bankruptcy judges are authorized to give a variety of protections to DIP 
lenders, including a superpriority lien that gives the DIP lender priority over all 
of the debtor's other creditors.90 
Now, to say that the DIP fmancing provisions are central to the U.S. 
framework, and that DIP fmancing encourages a renegotiation of the debtor's 
obligations, does not necessarily make such a practice desirable for corporate 
or sovereign bankruptcy. To determine whether DIP fmancing is desirable and 
should be adopted, in whole or in part, as part of an SDRM, we must first 
confront two threshold questions: first, why is a policy that facilitates new 
borrowing by a distressed debtor required?; and �second, should a court be left 
to decide whether to approve priority interim financing? 
With corporate debtors, it is not inherently obvious that paving the way to a 
restructuring is the optimal strategy in the event . of fmancial.distress. There .. 
may be good reasons for liquidating rather than reorganizing troubled 
companies. If the company is not viable as a going concern, for instance, 
reorganization may simply be postponing the inevitable. Moreover, even if 
DIP financing brings about a more efficient ex post outcome, it is still not 
obvious that it is a desirable form of new lending viewed from an ex ante 
perspective. We have argued in the previous Part that enforcement of absolute 
priority is efficient from an ex ante perspective:' Thus, is there not a 
contradiction in also contending that DIP fmancing is an important element of 
any efficient debt restructuring procedure? After all, the superpriority lien 
granted to DIP financing involves a violation of the absolute priority rule. So, 
why make room for DIP financing? 
The apparent contradiction between priority lending to facilitate debt 
restructuring and the absolute priority rule is resolved when one takes into 
account the collective action problems faced by creditors in any restructuring. 
89 For a brief survey of the existing empirical data. see Skeel, supra note 55. at 936 n.66. 
90 1 1  U.S.C. § 364 (2000) . 
• , See supra Part IV.A (discussing debt dilution). 
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Just as it is desirable to prevent a destructive run on the assets following a 
default, it is also preferable to avoid destructive "freeriding" by creditors in 
granting new funding aimed at reducing the overall costs of the debt crisis. 
Any new injection of funds can be seen as a new asset that is left up for grabs 
h¥ other crediJ:ors. Iflhe.new..fundingllas the same priority as the debt held by 
existing creditors, some or all of the funding may simply go to paying the 
existing creditors, thus reducing the likelihood that the new funding will be 
repaid. Therefore, to ensure that new value-increasing lending is forthcoming, 
higher priority status must be granted to the new loans. In other words, in the 
absence of higher priority DIP fInancing, there may be no new lending even if 
it is value-increasing because of the "overhang" of existing debt." 
The obvious concern with higher priority interim fInancing is that it also 
opens the door to value-reducing lending and debt dilution. We can put the 
same point in terms of under-and over-investment. When a debtor has a great 
deal of debt, new lenders will be reluctant to lend because some or all of the 
new cash will simply subsidize repayment to the existing creditors. Priority 
treatment of the new loan solves the under investment problem-it assures that 
the new lender gets paid fIrst-but it creates the risk of overinvestment, that is, 
that the lender, because it is protected, will make the loan even if it shoufd not 
be made." 
In corporate bankruptcy it is up to the court to determine whether the new 
funding increases the fum's capacity to meet its existing debt obligatious.'" 
Under current U.S. bankruptcy practice, bankruptcy courts-following the 
approach developed in Delaware during the 1990s-generally approve the 
initial financing immediately, in connection with other so-called "fIrst day 
orders" that are designed to enable the debtor to keep operating with as little 
disruption as possible. Delaware bankruptcy judges hold a more formal 
hearing several weeks later and reserve the authority to withdraw or adjust 
their approval if they later · determine that the terms of the loan are 
inappropriate." There is often considerable time pressure in evaluating and 
92 For a discussion of inefficient lending due to «debt overhang.�' see Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of 
C01pOrate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcON. 147 (1977). 
93 For a good discussion of these issues in the corporate bankruptcy context, see George G. Triantis� A 
Theory o/the Regulation of Debtor·In·Possession Financing, 46  v AND. L. REv. 901 (1993). 
94 See n U.s.C. § 364(c) (pro\liding lhat "the cOllrt, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the 
obtaining of credit or the incutting of debt"). 
95 See Judge Peter J. Walsh, Open Letter from Judge Peter J. Walsh to the Delaware Bankruptcy Bar 
Regarding First·Day DIP Fmancing Orders (Apr. 2, 1998), rel!.rinted in Marcus Cole, "Delaware Is Not a 
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granting DIP fmancing. This is why a court's  reputation in handling requests 
for new DIP financing quickly and efficiently appears to be an important 
determinant of distressed finns' decisions on where to file for bankruptcy." 
Although debt dilution is an important concern for sovereign debtors, the 
case for DIP fmancing to facilitate restmcturing by a distressed .sovereign is 
pemaps even stronger than for corporations. Indeed, even more than 
corporations, sovereigns may require immediate financial backing to stave off 
a possible run on the currency or the banking system. More generally, 
privileged lending aimed at reducing the costs of a severe temporary budget 
crisis and helping the sovereign's economy to grow out of a recession and thus 
to meet its future debt obligations is highly desirable. The difficulty lies 
mainly in devising a procedure for DIP financing that balances the benefits of 
new lending and the risks of further debt dilution. 
Unfortunately, when the debtor is a sovereign rather than a private 
corporation, it is far less obvious that a court is well situated to rule on DIP 
financing. Delicate sovereignty issues are involved in giving a court the 
authority to approve or reject new privileged lending to a government. In 
addition, even an experienced corporate bankruptcy judge is unlikely to have 
the expertise required to assess a country's public finances. To determine 
whether to approve a proposed fmancing arrangement, a bankruptcy judge 
must consider whether the new loan is likely to alleviate a temporary budget or 
foreign exchange crisis without exacerbating the country's debt burden. 
Although the relevant issues, such as the extent of debt overhang, are not 
entirely outside of the court's expertise, the bankruptcy judge is·likely te- be  
poorly infonned about the state of the country's public finances and the 
political constraints weighing on government expenditure and taxation. 
Especially at the outset of the crisis, when the initial detenuination is made, 
bankruptcy judges are likely to have only a limited understanding of the 
urgency and extent of the sovereign's short-tenn financial needs. That is not to 
say that regulation of DIP financing by a court is a clearly unworkable 
solution. But, before envisioning such a role for courts, it is important to 
explore whether other perhaps less intrusive alternatives are available. 
State": Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competiticn in Bankruptcy?, 55 V AND. L. REv. 1845, 1910. app. A 
(2002). 
96 In the corporate bankruptcy context, confidence that the court would make an immediate determination 
on the debtor's DIP financing was one of the major reasons that1tlany � 'coIpUmte debtors filed for ­
bankruptcy in Delaware in the 1990s. See, e.g., David A. Skeel. Jr., Bankruptcy CO!i11S and Bankruptcy 
Venue: Reflections on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REv. 1 , 2  (1998). 
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One alternative to the judge is, as recommended by the recent IMP 
proposal, to vest decisionmaking authority in the debtor's creditors."" This fits 
well with the objective of keeping the restructuring process in the handS' of the 
creditors and responds to the concerns about the SDRM's heavy-handedness. 
It is also likely that at least some of the larger institutional creditors will be 
better informed about the debtor's financial position and political constraints. 
In addition, creditors have a direct financial stake in the debtor's fortunes, 
which gives them a strong incentive to make the right decision. Although.this 
suggests that creditors might make better decisionmakers, they too face an 
important limitation: creditors generally are not well coordinated at the outset 
of the case, which makes creditor decisionmaking difficult when faced with 
issues that need to be decided early on. With DIP financing, the benefits of a 
better decision are likely to be overwhelmed by the adverse consequences of 
waiting to set up a creditor vote.·R 
From this perspective, the U.S. approach is arguably still a defensible 
compromise. The court is given primary authority, despite its shortcomings, 
because the judge can make an immediate determination. Before makiItg its 
decision, however, the court must entertain any objections from creditors, who 
are better but slower decisionmakers. To characterize this approach as 
defensible is not to say that it carmot be improved, however. Given a court's 
limitations as a decisionmaker, it is important to consider whether tirere-are­
ways to charmel or constrain its role more effectively. The most sensible 
strategy, in our view, would be to more carefully distinguish between interim 
fmancing that is presnmptively enforceable and financing that the court or 
other decisionmaker should presumptively prolnbit.99 
As we translate these insights into the sovereign debt context, we need to 
take one more key issue into account: the role of the IMP. The IMF already 
functions very much like a DIP lender when sovereigns encounter fmancial 
distress. As with most DIP lenders, the IMP usually has worked closely with 
the sovereign prior to any formal default, and has better information than 
private creditors about the sovereign's  fmancial status. These informational 
97 See 1MI'. SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3, at 4547 . 
. 98 This problem is closely related to the problem of holding a creditor vote to determme-whethet to' 
impose a stay on litigation, which we discussed earlier. See supra Part lI.A. 
99 To a certain extent, U.S. courts have begun to develop somewhat analogous -distinctions themselves. 
Most now treat cross-collateralization-that is� the use of collateral to secure not just the new financing by a 
DIP lender. but also earlier, unsecured obligations owed to the same lender-as presumptively unenforCeable. 
See, e.g., In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., %3 F.2d 1490 (1 1th Cir. 1992). Our proposal calls for much more 
stringent restrictions in the sovereign debt context. 
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advantages make the IMF an obVious choice to supply new funds. Moreover, 
IMF loans, like DIP financing, enjoy priority status, at least in theory. In 
practice, a strong norm that these loans will not- be renegotiated has also 
worked in favor of the IMF.lOO 
There are, however, two major concerns with IMF lending. First and 
foremost, a central impetus behind policy initiatives to reform the process of 
sovereign debt restructuring is the recognition that unchecked IMF lending 
may result in "moral hazard" in lending. Thus, unlike for private sources of 
DIP financing, the main concern with unchecked IMF lending is not so much 
that it may dilute the stock of outstanding debt as that it will give rise to too 
much repayment of existing debt obligations. In other words, the political 
pressures the IMP is under to extend huge programs to distressed countries 
and, thus, to bail out the private sector, while helping to alleviate the costs of a 
debt crisis ex post, may only give rise to greater ex ante inefficiencies in the 
form of renewed reckless lending. So, IMF leriding.needs to be reined in, not 
to avoid over-investment and dilution. but to prevent a wasteful bailout. 
A second, closely related concern in the case of crisis-prone countries like 
AIgentina is that the perceiVed priority of IMF loans is an illusion, which 
persists only as long as IMP loans are being rolled over. Shonld the IMP thus 
inadvertently lose its priority status, it would be lending at too favorable terms. 
This risk gives the IMP an incentive to keep lending even when the lending 
wonld not otherwise be justified. 
. 
Although the reasons for regnlating IMF lending are different from those 
for regulating private DIP financing, it is interesting to note that the same 
institution. perhaps a bankruptcy court, conld conceivably serve the dual role 
of keeping both forms of lending in check. In other words,  even if this may 
appear to be a politically uurealistic idea, it is worth pointing out that an 
important hidden benefit of delegating the decision to grant DIP financing to 
an international bankruptcy forum may be that it provides just the kind of 
institutional commitment power that is needed to credibly restrain the worst 
100 The IMP argues that its priority is justified, and must be protected, because it is Unot a commercial 
mganization seeking profitable lending opportunities," lending instead "at precisely the point at which othe.­
creditors are reluctant to do so." Kruegec, Sl<pra note 3, at II. For a discussion oftbe current failure to honor 
tbe priorities of other creditors, see Sl<pra notes 9·10, 24 and accompanying texL 
In addition to these similarities to a DIP lender, tbe IMP has anotber valuable attribute as well Whe.-eas 
private creditors tend to focus solely on their own loan� the IMP takes systemic risk into account-a crucia1ly 
important factor given the risk of contagion when a sovereign debtor defaults. Together� these qualities argue 
for the IIvIF to continue serving as the focal point for interim financing during a restructuring. 
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temptations of the IMF to bail out the private sector. Just as an independent 
central bank is a cornerstone of a credible monetary policy targeting inflation, 
an independent international bankruptcy court may be the best gu'arailtee 
against excessive bailouts.w1 
It is interesting to observe in this respect that the plan proposed-by tlre iMF  . 
for an SDRM entirely excludes IMF loans and programs from the SDRM. In 
other words, IMF lending will remain completely unchecked. There may well 
be strong political considerations behind this decision. While giving a 
bankruptcy court authority to grant DIP financing may be seen as an important 
encroachment on a debtor's sovereignty, it may be perceived as an equally 
unacceptable limitation of the power of the governing board of the IMF. 
Whatever the reasons behind the proposal to exclude IMF lending may be, this 
issue underscores the concerns expressed by many commentators about the 
credibility and authority of an SDRM forum that is not fully independent of the 
IMF."12 
Based on the analysis thus far, we can start sketching the eutlill.es.of a 
financing scheme that would adapt the benefits of U.S.-style DIP financing to 
the sovereign bankruptcy framework. Based on financial considerations alone; 
the fmancing provisions should assure priority status to the DIP lender, but the 
court or other decisiomnaker's discretion to authorize this priority: .shwkLbe .­
restricted rather than unfettered. In many, perhaps most, cases, the IMF should 
serve as the initial lender. But IMF lending should ideally be su� to the 
same restrictions as interim financing by other lenders. 
The framework we propose is quite simple. The SDRM decisionmaker 
should be instructed to distinguish between two categories of proposed priority 
lending, loan packages that are presumptively permissible and those that are 
101 One might be tempted to argue that, just as a fixed money supply rule is the best guarantee against 
inflation, an even better guarantee against bailouts is to reduce the budget of the IMF. so that it will not have 
the means to pUISne such a policy. But just as a fixed money supply rule has been <lismlssed as an excessively 
crude macroeconomic policy� it would be overkill to cut the financial wings of the 1MF (or possibly shut it 
down as some have advocated) just to avoid the still rare occurrence of an excessive bailout. 
102 Interestingly. a more restrictive approach to DIP financing could alleviate a problem that is closely 
related to the IMF's preference for large lending packages. Because it usually canoot provide all of the 
financing that its plans call for. the IMF has often required sovereigns to secure additional funds from private 
lenders in addition to any IMF lending. When the IMF has required the private funds to come first, before the 
fund will agree to lend, the resulls have been quite di.scowaging. See, e.g .• ErCllENGREEN & RUEHL. supra 
note 10; at T! C'Requiring countries seeking IMP assistance to first raise new money is unrealistic, given the 
palpable reluctance of investors who do not already have a stake in the crisis country to lend into uncertain 
conditions."). An SDRM, coupled with limited DlP financing. would avoid these kinds of problems. 
., •... 
,.,1:' ., 
'� 
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presUmptively impermissible. The distinction would be based on the 
magnitude of the proposed loan, and tied in particular to the sovereign debtor's 
current trade debt needs. Funds that are needed to finance a sovereign debtor's 
general trade debt should be approved.Ioo Larger loans, on the other hand, 
.would k presumptively impermissible and would require approval by the 
court or some other decisionmaker. The effect would be to authorize enough 
lending to meet the. sovereign's current cash flow needs after a default, while 
minlmizing the risk that the loan's priority status would lead to overborrowing . .  
By tying presumptively permissible DIP financing to the sovereign's trade 
debt needs, we do not mean to suggest that larger loans could never be given 
the special DIP financing priority. Larger loans would be presumptively 
impermissible, not forbidden per se. There might be good reasons for a larger 
interim fmancing arrangement, and sovereigns should, in our view, be able to 
get DIP financing beyond trade credit, but then the loan should be subject to 
approval by the bankruptcy court or some other decisionmaker. Whether the 
court or a majority of the creditors should have ultimate discretion to approve 
large DIP financing arrangements involves a delicate balancing of efficiency 
. and.political considerations. 
In all likelihood, large-scale DIP financing could only be arranged in a 
truly timely fashion if a court had authority to gram it- To pIOlIide a safeguard _ 
against excessively profligate judges, creditors could be given the right to 
challenge a court decision approving extensive DIP fmancing. The advantage 
of court approval with a right of creditor challenge is that it would avoid the 
delays that would attend an alternative such as creditor voting. 
Conversely, giving a court the power to approve DIP fmancing may not be 
politically feasible. Neither creditors, nor sovereign debtors, nor the IMF may 
be prepared to give up so much power to a court restructuring sovereign debt. 
In that case, it is clearly preferable to allow for DIP fmancing that is approved 
by a majority vote of all of the sovereign's creditors, rather than to ban it 
altogether. On balance, we believe that requiring a creditor vote on extensive 
DIP financing proposals is the most plausible strategy. Although delays such 
as the time necessary to identify the claims eligible for voting would 
103 As of December, 2003, for example, Peru's current trade debt was $3.7 billion. according to World 
Bani<<itatistics. To put this in perspeetive, Peru's outstanding bank debt was $4 billion; its oolstanding bonds 
totaled $25 billion. its Brady Bonds $2.5 billion, and ils multilateral debt (that is, debt to other countries) $6 
billion. World Bank, Joint BIS·lMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on External Debt: Peru (May 28, 20(4). 
available at bttp:llwww.oeed.orgIdataoecdl54155131604166.pdf. 
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discourage debtors from proposing such fmancing, this approach is the most 
politically feasible, and the chilling effect may in fact be desirable in many 
contexts. 
To summarize: under our proposal, the SDRM would divide ' interim 
financing into two categories, based on presumptions as to what is and is not 
permissible. The decisionmaker would simply approve loans that were tied to 
the sovereign's reasonable trade debt needs. Priority finaucing for larger loans, 
however, may have to be approved by a majority of the sovereign's creditors. 
This approach would have the virtue of significantly constraining the SDRM 
decisionmaker's discretion, and it would minimize the risk of overborroWing. 
VI. WHO SHOULD THE INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKER BE? 
One of the most hotly contested questions in the debate over sovereign 
bankruptcy is who the decisionmaker should be. Most existing proposals 
recommend one of three choices: the IMF, an existing international 
organization, or a hypothetical new international organization. We begin this 
Part by briefly considering each of the proposed decisionmaking institntions 
and by pointing out the serious shortcomings of all of these alternatives. We 
then propose a very different decisionmaker: existing corporate bankruptcy 
courts. As we shall see, existing bankruptcy or insolvency courts offer several 
intrigning advantages over the competing choices. 
A. Shortcomings of the IMF and Other Intemational lnstitutions 
The most obvious choice as overseer of a new SDRM is the IMF itself. In 
effect, the IMF already serves as a gatekeeper, since IMF approval is often a 
prerequisite to restructnring or otherwise addressing a sovereign debt crisis. 
The lMF's close involvement also gives it much better information about a 
sovereign's financial predicament than any outside decisionmaker would have. 
Given that the IMF is already intimately involved in these issues, and that 
SDRM oversight could be added to the lMF's job description without altering 
its mission, one can easily imagine the IMF as the principal bankruptcy 
decisionmaker.'04 
104 Not sUIprisingly, the lMF's first sovereign bankruptcy proposals have taken this view. In outlining the 
lMF's case for an SDRM, for instance, Anne Krueger emphasized that amending the "Fund's Articles [ro 
implement an SDRMJ . . .  would not entail a significant transfer of legal authority ro the institution." 
Especially is this so, sbe argued, given that "the essential decision-making power would be vested in the 
debtor and a super-majority of its creditors." Krueger. supra note.3. at 9-10. 
:;--
1 , 
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For all its benefits, however, IMF oversight has two major drawbacks: first, 
. .  the.1MF would have a significant conflict of interest. As lender of last resort, 
the IMF is a likely to be a creditor of the sovereign debtor. As decisiomnaker, 
on the other hand, its responsibility would be to mediate impartially among the 
. various constituencies of the sovereign debtor. The second concern is political. 
IMF decisionmaking has in some instances been driven more by political 
pressures by the United States or other G-7 members than by the economics of 
the crisis in qnestion. As decisionmaker in, a restructuring, its motives and 
impartiality may continually be questioned, making it ultimately an ineffective 
administrator of the restructuring process. 
Once again, we do not have to look far to fmd a useful analogy to the 
dilemma posed by a regulator who acts both as an arbiter among creditors and 
as one of the creditors. In U.S. banking law, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) wears the same two hats. Becanse the FDIC gnarantees 
the safety of bank deposits, it steps into the shoes of bank depositors if the 
.bank runs into fmancial distress, which in essence makes the FDIC a bank's 
largest unsecured creditor. At the same time, the FDIC decides how to dispose 
.of_ a .bank's assets, and determines the treatment of the bank's creditors. 
During the banking crisis of the 19908, the FDIC's dual role created or 
magnified conflicts in a variety of contexts. 
lOS 
The FDIC's special concern with avoiding a costly bank run when a bank: 
encounters Tmancial distress is closely related to tOO IMP:s- � with 
avoiding currency runs and contagious debt crises. Because of the risk of a 
bank run, banks cannot be reorganized in the same way as other Companies. 
When insolvent banks are small they are invariably liquidated rather than 
reorganized, usually through deposit transfers or sales to third parties, and the 
entire process is arranged by the FDIC in secret before it is announced. The 
need for speed, secrecy, and regnlatory approval all point to the FDIC as the 
logical overseer. 
Secrecy and speed may be just as important in the early stages of a 
sovereign debt restructuring, and the IMF is well pOsitioned to keep tliings 
quiet. But, when it comes to large sovereign debt crises, the IMF may be 
105 See, e.g., Saman!ha Evans, Note, An FDIC Priority of Claims Over Depository Institution 
.. , filwrdwfmm, --1991 DuKE L.J. 329 (criticizing FDIC assertion of priority over shareholders in pursuing claims 
against direcroJs and officers). Au even bigger complaint was that bank regulators waited too long to declare 
banks insolvent. For discussion. see David A. Skeel, Jr .. The Law and Finance oj Bank and Insurance 
Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEx. L. REv. 723 (1997). 
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reluctant to impose aggressive discipline, much as banking regulators are 
tempted to forbear when a troubled bank is viewed as "too big to fail." 
Furthermore, the IMF cannot achieve the other benefits that justify rDlC 
control of bank insolvency proceedings. Unlike bank insolvencies, for 
-- instance, sovereigu debt restrncturings cannot be resolved by a single decisive 
transaction such as a liquidation or sale of assets. The process is more 
complicated and necessarily involves the input of other parties such as the 
sovereign's major creditors. The lMF will of course play a central role in the 
restructuring process. But given the IMF's conflicting interests, and its 
susceptibility to political pressures, it makes more sense to place oversight 
authority in a more disinterested decisionmaker. 
In addition to the IMF, the other leading option for SDRM oversight is to 
vest this authority in a new international decisionmaking body or, in _ the 
alternative, to expand the scope of an existing organization. The IMF's most 
recent approacho-is a' hybrid between lMF oversight and establishing a new 
SDRM decisionmaker;l06 thus, we will focus on the possibility of a newly 
created decisionmaker in the discussion that follows. As shonld be gvident, 
bDwever, Jooking to an existing international organization would raise 
precisely the same concerus as those we identify above. 
Under the IMFs most recent proposal, an independent committee would 
select the members of a selection committee, and the selection committee 
wonld then pick the judges for the decisionmaking body, the SDDRF.'07 
Unlike the lMF, the SDDRF would not have a financial stake in the decisions 
it makes, and all of its judges would be selected with their independence. Ut 
mind. The most obvious selling point of the new body is this independence. 
Unfortunately, even the carefully structured nomination procedure in the 
lMF's proposal provides no real guarantee of independence. Just reciting the 
layers of process (e.g., the committee that selects a committee) gives a sense of 
how susCeptible to political pressure the selection process may be. When it 
comes to actual SDRM decisions, there is a real risk that the SDDRF wonld 
'not be'an impartial decisionmaker and that the new board's deliberations, like 
the selection of its members, would be undermined by political considerations. 
,,)6 lMF, SDRM DEsIGN, supra note 3, at 56-10 (proposing a new Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution 
Forum that would be "an OIgan of the Fund" but would H operate , , , independently of the Fund's Executive 
Boan!, BoanI of GovernOIS, management and staff"); see also Benjamin J. Cohen, A Global Chapter 11. 75 
FoREIGN PoL'y 109, 125' (1989) (argu.ing that a "wholly new and independent entity" should be- created; in 
order "to nnderscore . . . impartiality and objectivity" in the decisionmaking process), 
107 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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One could respond to these concerns by adding further guarantees of the 
tribunal' s independence,I" but the suspicion of political interference is likely to 
remain. In short, with both the IMF's proposals and those of others to rely on 
an international decisionmaking body, there is a serious risk that politics may 
influence the tribunal's deliberations. 
Another potential concern with the proposed SDDRF as currently 
envisioned is that it may not have sufficient powers to be able to administer the 
debt restructuring process efficiently. As currently contemplated, the court's 
strongest sanction is that it may decide to avoid the process entirely and throw 
the parties back to the current status quo where they must renegotiate the debt 
without the help of a majority vote binding on a dissenting minority. But 
wielding such a strong weapon may often not be plausible, and in the absence 
of any other sanctions it may be difficult for the court to reprimand a sovereign 
or a creditor that deliberately attempts to slow down the process, submits false 
claims, or abuses the judicial process in other ways. 
B. Tapping the Expertise of Existing Bankruptcy Courts 
As -we chronicle the flaws of existing proposals. to vest authority over. 
sovereign bankruptcy in the IMF or an international tribunal, we mnst be 
carefutnot to lapse into utopian despair. The fact that a proposal falls short of 
perfection does not necessarily mean it should be rejected. An imperfect 
decisioNnaker may be the best option we have in the real world. In this case, 
however, there may be a better alternative. 
We argue in this s�tion that authority over the SDRM process should be 
vested in existing corporate bankruptcy or insolvency courts. Existing courts 
are not perfect either, but they offer several striking advantages as compared to 
the IMF or an international organization. In the discussion that follows, we 
begin by briefly outlining the contours of our proposal. We then will address a 
series of potential objections to this strategy. 
, 108 . In a proposal that seems to have influenced the IMF's own recommendation on this issue, Steve­
Scbwarcz argues, for instance, that the International Cenlre for Settlement of Investment Disputes be used as a 
model for a new decisiomnaking tribunal. Schwarcz, supra nore I, at 1024-30; see also Uf. at 1024 (suggesting 
that the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice could be expanded to include SDRM disputes). A 
tribunal based '  on this model would rely on a panel of neutral arbitrntors who would "have different 
nationalities." and would include ·'representative[s] ·of the principal bankruptcy and insolvency law systems of 
the world." [d. at 1026. 
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Our proposal is simple: rather than looking to a supranational 
decisionmaker, sovereign debtors should be permitted to file for bankruptcy in 
the courts of any foreign jurisdiction whose law governs a portion .of the 
sovereign's private debt. To avoid the problem of "home court" favoritism, 
sovereign debtors or creditors should not be allowed to me in the sovereign's 
own courts, but the sovereign could select the bankruptcy arbiter of any 
jurisdiction where it issued bonds or bank debt. Under current practice, the 
majority of sovereign debt is issued in New York and is subject to New York 
law. The other major source of bond issues is London, with Tokyo or 
Frankfurt issuing a much smaller share.'09 This means that most sovereigns 
could choose from among one or more of these four jurisdictions. A sovereign 
that followed its New York debt would file in the bankruptcy court for the 
Southern District of New York; a London case would go to a judge with 
insolvency jurisdiction over administrative receiverships; and Frankfurt or 
Tokyo cases would be handled by the bankruptcy courts in those locations. 
There is one small qualification. To assure that sovereign debtors did not 
issue debt in a jurisdiction on the eve of default solely for the.� of 
gaining access to the jurisdiction's bankruptcy courts, a sovereign's venue 
choice should be limited to jurisdictions where it had issued debt at least 
eighteen months before bankruptcy."o Other than this timing limitation, 
however, together with a minimum amount requirement, sovereignr..ooulIifile� 
wherever they issued their debt. 
Perhaps the most important benefit of this approach, as compared to 
employing the IMF or an international body, is that it relies o.n.. an existing. 
decisionmaker and legal community who already have the relevant expertise 
and anthority to conduct the judicial process. In each of these courts, 
moreover, initial decisions are made by a single judge. As a result, courts 
would be well positioned to make immediate decisions on issues like interim 
financing; there would be no need to wait until, say, an arbitral panel was 
assembled to oversee the case. In addition, the bankruptcy or insolvency judge 
would be much less likely than the IMF or the SDDRF to be subject to political 
109 See Anthony J.' Richards & Marl< Gugiatti, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New Yark Law . 
Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers (Jul. 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.ooml 
ab,t:ract=443840. 110 U.S. law provides an analogous (1hough aborter) reachback provision for corporate debtors. The U.S. 
baukruptcy venue provision permits a corporation to file in the district of its domicile, resideoce,.pMcipalc. 
place of basiness. or principal assets for the majority of the 180 days before bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1408(1 }(2000). In effect, this requires that the venue require�ent be met for a minimlUIl of ninety-one days. 
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pressures. In short, the conflict-of-interest concerns that would bedevil each of 
the other proposed decisionmakers do not loom nearly as large for bankruptcy 
courts. 
The first and most obvious objection to our proposal is that gIvrng 
sovereign debtors a choice of filing locations will enable them to shop for .the. 
laxest forum and perhaps lead to a race to the bottom, with courts exacerbating 
debtors' moral hazard by making it too easy for sovereigns to shed their debt."l 
This is the same kind of complaint that has been lodged against the U:S. · 
corporate bankruptcy framework. In the United States, most corporate debtors 
have a variety of filing options, and several ' courts-most prominently 
Delaware and New York-have attracted a disproportionate number of the 
biggest cases."2 Critics complain that the judges in these jurisdictions have 
undermined the bankruptcy process by rushing cases along, being too generous 
in paying attorneys' and bankruptcy fees, or by favoring debtors and their 
manageFS-the allegations vary-in order to attract these reputation-enhancing 
113 cases. 
Rather than undermining the case for giving sovereign debtors a choice of 
--bankruptcy court, the fornm-shopping analysis actually proves on inspection to .. 
underscore its attractions. To see this, note first that even with corporate 
.debtors, the venue-shopping complaints are largely misguided. Although 
critics complain that Delaware is too friendly to managers or their attorneys, 
for mlitance, this does not explain the fact that creditors often are the ones who 
insist that the case be filed in Delaware.!!' Bankruptcy lawyers who have 
handled cases in Delaware usually attribute Delaware's popularity t&t:he-speed 
111 This complaint is • variation of the longstanding criticism of Delaware's prominence in U.s. corporate 
law, and its antecedents in the corporate restructuring context date back at least to the 1930s. The classic 
account of the "race to the bottom" thesis in corporate law is William L Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974). For a brief history of debates ove<: Delaware's 
role in corporate reorganization� including the complaints made during the New Deal exa, see Skeel. supra note 
96, at 5· 16. 
112 Chicago may also be earning a pJace on this roster. Prominent :recent cases filed in Chicago include 
the Kmart, United Airlines, and Conseco bankruptcies. See, e.g., Amy Merrick, Chicago Cimrt IWeplly 
Attracts Chapter 11 Cases, WAll ST. J., Dec. 10, 2002, atBL 
113 The most frequent critic has been L)'11Il LoPucki. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPuclci & Joseph W. Doberty, 
Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy ReorganizatWns Failing?755 VAND. L REv. 1933 (2OO2?; LJ'I"l>­
M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: 
Empirical Evidence ofa "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L REv. 231 (2001). 
il4 See David A Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad About Defilware?, 54 V AND. L REv. 309, 315 (2001). Stated 
differently, creditors' enthusiasm for Delaware suggests tha� to Il1e extent Delaware's willingness to'P"Y' 
bankruptcy Iawy= New Yode rates was a factor, this cannot be the only reason debtoll; sought out Il1e 
Delaware bankruptcy court in the 19905. 
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of Delaware cases and the expertise of its bankruptcy judges. This is 
consistent with the existing empirical data, which suggests that Delaware cases 
were much faster than cases in other jurisdictions in the 1990s, and iliac debtdrS 
were most likely to file in Delaware rather than their "home court" (that is, the 
jurisdiction where the company's headquarters or principal assets were 
located) if the home court was inexperienced or the case was especially le 115 comp x. 
Sovereigns can be expected to take similar considerations into account 
when they select a filing location. A sovereign that wishes to restructure its 
obligations quickly and return to the capital markets will pay especial attention 
to the expertise of the respective bankruptcy courts, and the courts, in turn, 
have an incentive to demonstrate efficiency and expertise if they wish to attract 
important cases. It is also worth noting that tying the choice of courts to the 
location of the sovereign's debt-New York, London, Frankfurt, or Tokyo for 
most sovereign debtors-assures that the case will be overseen by a 
jurisdiction that is likely to be sympathetic to the sovereign's creditors. 
Requiring the case to be filed in a creditor jurisdiction provides a useful 
counterbalance to the sovereign debtor's advantages-in particular, its rights to 
invoke the SDRM and to select the filing location. In short, jurisdiction 
shopping is a significant virtue of, not a problem for, the proposal. 
A second possible concern is that ordinary courts cannot handle cases that 
have such large international implications as would a sovereign. bankruptcy 
proceeding. Only an arbiter with international credentials, on this view, could 
oversee an SDRM."6 Before the late 1970s, when sovereigns first started 
routinely waiving their traditional inununity from litigation, Jl7 this objection 
would have c.arried more weight But we now have a much more extensive 
track record of domestic courts resolving issues involving sovereigns. 
Certainly, sovereign bankruptcy is a more elaborate proceeding than most legal 
issues, but the court's oversight role is also quite constrained under the 
115 KENN!!TH M. AYOITll & DAVID A. SKEEl., JR., WHY Do DIsTREssED CoMPANIES CHOOSE DELAWARE? 
AN EMPlRlCAl. ANALYSIS OF VENuE CHOlCE IN BANKRUPTCY (Uruv. of Fa, Inst. for Law & &on. Resean:h 
Paper No. 03-29, May 2(03), available at http://ssrn.comiabstractid=46300L 
116 A related but different question is the issue of how the outcome of the SDRM would be e11fo=,d. 
What would keep the sovereign from simply refusing to honor the tenDs of the court's restructuring? The 
short answer is that the same interests-the desire to retain membership in the IMP and to have access to the 
eredit markets-that induce sovereigns to try to repay 1heir obligations in the first instance would also give 
them an incentive to honor the terms of the restructuring. MOreover? a sovereign that participated in the 
SDRM, and proposed a restructuring plan, is particularly unlikcly to simply 1humb its nose at 1he outcome. 
117 See, e.g., Buchheit & Qulali, supra Dole 5. at 1334 (desqibing the waiver trend). 
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framework we have proposed, whlch leaves much of the process to be worked 
out by the parties. Nor should the magnitude of the cases be cause for alarm. 
New York and London courts already have' experience handling huge 
bankruptcies. The bankruptcies of companies such as Maxwell, Polly Peck, 
WorldCom, and Global Crossing, for instance, involve larger amounts of 
outstanding debt than most sovereign debt restructuring cases. Particularly if 
the cases are brought in major economic centers like New Y orl<, London, or 
Tokyo, a comrnercial bankruptcy or insolvency judge will be equal to the .. 
oversight task. 
A final, somewhat similar objection focuses on a court's difficulty in 
implementing sovereign bankruptcy rules that differ markedly from the 
jurisdiction'S domestic bankruptcy or insolvency rules. Once again, there is 
much less to !his objection than meets the eye. Given the similarities between 
the SDRM and U.S. Chapter 11, !his objection would worry about judges in 
London oc T�kyo, whose bankruptcy systems are much less oriented toward 
reorganization. But !here is no reason to believe that London or Tokyo judges 
'would find the SDRM disorienting, either. The ftamework is quite simple� and 
courts have managed to apply unfamiliar rules in other contexts.'" Moreover, 
London bankers and lawyers have been strong advocates of sovereign 
bankruptcy, and the SDRM is in many respects simply an elaboration of the 
collective action provisions that are already included- irt 1:fte- so,eteign .. debt ·  
governed by London law. It is hard to imagine that London judges will fiud 
sovereign bankruptcy, with its strong London inflnence; uncongenial� 
To sununarize, vesting SDRM authority in domestic bankruptcy judges 
avoids the politicization that would undermine international decisionmakers. 
Decisions would be made promptly, and the threat of political meddling or 
conflicts of interest would be much lower. Giving the sovereign debtor a 
choice to file in any jurisdiction where it has issued debt would reinforce these 
.virtues by creating healthy interjurisdictional competition among bankruptcy 
courts. A court !hat wished to attract sovereign bankruptcy cases would need 
to establish a reputation for efficiency and expertise, and the competition to do 
so would enhance the quality of all of the courts where a sovereign debtor 
might file. 
118 Cross-border insolvency cases pose " somewhat similar challenges in the bankruptcy and insolvency 
context. For a survey of recent efforts by the IMF, World Bank; and oihecorga:nizalions 11) develop refonns in 
this area, see, for example, Frederick Thng, is lntemo.tkmal Bankruptcy Possibk?, 23 MICH. J. OO'L L 31 
(2001). 
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Indeed, the attractions of jurisdictional competition raise the question 
.:whether we .,might want to go even further, and instruct sovereigns to specify 
their SDRM location ex ante. Under this ex ante (or pure jurisdictional choice) 
approach, each sovereign would pick a single jurisdiction as its filing location 
m tae  eveRt..it later inv.oked.the SDRM. This ex ante choice strategy, which 
has been advocated in the international insolvency and corporate bankruptcy 
contexts,'  19 has significant theoretical attractions. Since sovereigns would pick 
a jurisdiction before they borrowed additional new funds-and their choice 
would be limited to a single court-their cost of credit would fully reflect the 
merits or demerits of the court they selected. S overeigns that selected an 
inefficient (e.g., excessively prodebtor) &cisionm:aker would (in theory) face 
higher credit costs. This would give the sovereign a strong incentive to seek, 
and courts an incentive to provide, efficient SDRM oversight. 
While we recognize the virtues of a pure jurisdictional choice strategy, 
linking the SDRM decisioIllllliker to the sovereign's issuance of debt is 
preferable for several reasons. Perhaps the most important problem with 
precommitting to a particular jurisdiction is the difficulty of making midstream 
corrections. Once a debtor has made its choice, it is very difficult to change its 
selection later if subsequent events make the original choice ill-advised.'2\! The 
debtor is in a much better position to select a filing location at the time of filing 
than it is when there is no filing in prospect. Second, there may be so...:FrigRty 
concerns about a sovereign's precommitting to a particular nation's bankruptcy 
or insolvency courts in the event of a future sovereign bankruptcy 'filing. 
Third, the prospect that a sovereignveuld choose any jurisdiction in the world 
as the filing location, even one with no ties to the debtor or any of its creditors, 
could provoke political resistance to the SDRM. A$ a practical matter, we 
suspect that most sovereigns would select New York, London, Tokyo, Zurich, 
or Frankfurt as their filing location, even if they had unbridled discretion ex 
ante, since sovereigns who chose a potential lax jurisdiction would pay the 
price for this choice in the credit markets. But, given the practical and political 
ll9 See. e.g., Robert K Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Curp<>rate Bankruptcy, 71 
TEx. L REv. 51 . (1992); Robert K Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private 
Ordering, 98 MIcH. L REv. 2252 (2000), 
120 Advocates of pure jurisdictional choice for corporate debtors have proposed that debtors who wish to 
change fueir selection should be permitted to do so if they held a vore of all of their creditors and a majority of 
the creditors approve. � Seef'..e...c_ • ..Robert: J{.,..Rasmussen & Randall S. 1homas� Timing Matters; Promoting 
Forum Shopping by insolvent Curp<>rations, 94 Nw. U. L REv. 1357. 1399·1402 (2000). The global vol!: 
would be quite cumbersome, however-rather like a bankruptcy proceeding in it:self-and the effort to switch 
jmisdictions could have adverse signaling effects for the debtor. §ee. e.g., Skeel,. supra note 114, at 328 D.61. 
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concerns we have just noted, the best way to structure the jurisdictional choice 
is to give sovereigns the ex post option to file for bankmptcy in any location 
where they have issued sovereign debt. 
VII. SHOULD DESIGNER SDRMs BE PERMITTED? 
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the sovereign bankmptcy 
framework will use a one-size-fits-all approach. Policymakers will develop a 
single set of provisions dealing with the issues we have discussed-fue 
standstill, classification, voting, and so on-and the framework will then be 
implemented through a treaty process. As a conceptual matter, adopting a 
uniform, mandatory set of SDRM provisions obviously is the simplest 
approach. But it is not the only way to proceed. An alternative strategy might 
permit sovereigns to design a sovereign bankmptcy framework that fits their 
own particula!: circumstances. 
This Part argues that sovereigns should be given precisely this kind of 
flexibility. We begin by pointing out that there is both theoretical support and, 
.more. intriguingly, historical precedent for permitting designer SDRMs. We 
then briefly explore how sovereigns might tailor the bankmptcy framework, 
and conclude by considering whether sovereigns shonld be prevented from 
adopting provisions that make restructuring more, rather than less, difficnlt. 
Some of the most innovative work in the 1egal .ftterature -on corporate 
bankmptcy in recent years has focused on the possibility of designing 
bankmptcy provisions by contract. According to proponents of bankmptcy 
contract, if courts did not prohibit companies from waiving their right to file 
for Chapter 1 1  in the United States, a company and its creditors could improve 
on the existing statutory framework by devising their own bankmptcy rules to 
address central issues such as managers' choice whether to reorganize or 
liquidate the frrm.12I Critics, however, have questioned whether tailored 
bankmptcy provisions would be cost-justified for a healthy company and 
whether they could be effectively adjusted to take account of the debtor's 
borrowing arrangements with subsequent creditors.122 Even if one views the 
most optimistic claims for a bankmptcy contract with skepticism, this literature 
121 Alan Schwartz has been the principal proponent of bankruptcy contract. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz. A 
Omtract Thwry Approach t" Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALEL.J. 1807 (1998). 122 See, e.8., Lynn M. wPncki. C"ntroct Bankruptcy: A Reply ro Alan Schwanz, 109 YALE LJ. 317 
(1999). For Schwartz's response, see Alan Schwartz. Bankruptcy Contracting Revisited, 109 YALE L.J. 343 
(1999). 
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underscores the virtues of giving a debtor and its creditors the right to opt out 
of the existing statutory framework if they wish. 
Interestingly, the possibility of a tailored approach to bankruptcy-or at the 
least, to some of its key terms-is not simply hypothetical.123 In order to pass 
the first truly permanent U.S. bankruptcy law at the end of the nineteenth 
century, bankruptcy proponents were forced to make a series of compromises 
'" with Southern . and Western lawmakers who opposed the legislation.12< 
Particularly important was a provision permitting each state to determine what 
property debtors in that state could exempt from their creditors if the debtor 
filed for bankruptcy. The beauty of this compromise was that it enabled state 
lawmakers to adjust their exemptions in accordance with local norms as to 
what (and how much) property a debtor should retain in order to facilitate a 
"fresh start" after bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law was federal, but it was (and 
still is) tailored in significant respects on a state-by-state basis. 
This historical precedent has direct implications for sovereign bankruptcy. 
Although proponents of an SDRM have not recommended that sovereigns be 
permitted to tailor the provisions in any way, we suspect this may simply be 
because they have not yetfucused on the issue. Once we shine the spotlight on 
the question, the case for at least limited opt-out is compelling. To see this, 
suppose that ll: nation had the same kinds of concerns for its citizens' welfare 
that Southern and Western states had in the United States iIi the nineteenth 
century. One manifestation'of this might be social welfare protections that the 
sovereign debtor wisbed to guarantee to its citizens even ill the event of 
fmancial distress. Permitting the sovereign debtor to indude-tbis .protection.in ' "  . 
its version of the SDRM would provide the same benefits as did the 
exemptions compromise in U.S. bankruptcy law: not ouly would opt-out 
permit sovereign debtors to tailor the SDRM to local norms, but it could also 
have the political benefit of increasing their willingness to adopt a sovereign 
bankruptcy'framework. 
To be sure, if every sovereign adopted a different SDRM, this might 
complicate creditors' efforts to price sovereign debt. . But the pricing of 
sovereign debt is already complex and nation-specific; it is uulikely that a 
tailored ·SDRM would add significantly to this complexity. Moreover, we 
suspect that the kind of provision we have descnbed would be the exception 
123 The illustration in this paragraph develops an application first made in Bolton. supra oote..JA..,..at�_ __ 
l24 For discussion. see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw ill 
AMEruCA41-42 (2001). 
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rather than the rule. Most sovereigns would hesitate to add provisions which, 
as with a social welfare opt-out, softened the effect of fmancial distress and 
thns interfered with the priority of the sovereign's creditors. Sovereigns that 
included such provisions would face higher credit costs ex ante. Only if there 
were an extremely strong local commitment to the protection in question 
would a sovereign soften the framework rather than sticking with the status 
quo. 
But what about opting out of the SDRM to add harsher provisions, rather 
than softer ones? Here, things get a bit trickier. Given their desire to 
maximize access to credit and minimize its costs, sovereign borrowers have a 
greater incentive to adopt harsh bankruptcy provisions rather than soft ones. 
Recall from our discussion at the outset of the Article that sovereigns may in 
fact agree to make reStructuring too difficult, since, among other things, 
current political leaders eIUoy the benefits of a lower cost of credit but are not 
likely to be arotmd to bear the consequences of any problems this causes down 
the roati "5 Under these circumstances, contractual flexibility' may not always 
lead to an efficient result. The question, then, is this: should sovereigns be 
precluded from adopting amendments to make restructuring more rather than 
less difficult? 
Despite the risk that an opt-out may include inefficiently harsh terms, we 
believe, on balance, that sovereigns should be given at least some limited 
flexibility te-Gpt (or not opt) out of aspects of the SDRM as the.y see fiL For 
example, some sovereigns may have acquired a solid reputation of 
creditworthiness at the cost of strict and prolonged fiscal discipline. ' TheSe 
sovereigns may fear that their reputational capital will be watered down by the 
introduction of the SDRM and may therefore be opposed to its adoption, If 
these sovereigns are prepared to support the SDRM only if they can opt out of 
some provisions-for example, if they can strengthen the superrnajority rule 
requrrw to approve a restructuring plan-this may be a small political price to 
pay to be able to implement an SDRM procedure, 
Once again, as with our case for opt-out in general, our defense of full 
flexibility rests in part on theoretical considerations and in part on political 
. ones. .The theoretical case for flexibility is quite simple, Although there is a 
real risk of inefficiently harsh terms, some sovereigns may have legitimate 
reasons to tinker with the framework in ways that make restructuring more 
125 See supra note 14 and accompanying teXt. 
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difficult. We are hesitant to cut off an alternative that might make sense for 
some sovereign debtors. But the political factors point in the opposite 
direction and, in our view, outweigh the virtues of flexibility. We suspect that 
both sovereign debtors and their creditors would be hostile to a sovereign 
bankruptcy proposal that could be softened but not tightened. Creditors would 
complain that this approach encourages moral hazard and easy default, and 
sovereigns would worry about the effect on their access to credit. If sovereigns 
are permitted to tailor the SDRM to fit their needs-and we think they should 
be-they should therefore be given the flexibility to adopt provisions that 
make the framework harsher rather than softer if they so choose. 
TIlls is not to say that complete flexibility to opt out should be allowed. 
Clearly, an opt-out of the entire scheme would not achieve any gain relative to 
the current status quo. Thus, all members should be subject to the broad main 
provisions of the SDRM, but they should also be allowed to strengthen or 
weaken somewhat specific provisions like the majority rule, stay, DIP 
financing, and classification provisions to reflect their specific circumstances 
in light of how they affect the balance between the interests of creditoIS-and 
those of the sovereign. ,16 
CONCLUSION 
We have argned in this Article that neither the existing approach to 
sovereign debt crises-ad hoc efforts to restructure, together with the prospect 
of an IMF-Ied bailout-. nor increased use of collective action provisions is an 
adequate response. Because of their short-term focus, sovereign 
decisionmakers may agree to excessively harsh conditions on restructuring, 
aud the prospect of bailouts creates serious moral hazard on the part of 
creditors. Collective action provisions might facilitate restructuring in some 
cases, but they will only be effective if the sovereign debtor has a relatively 
126 As suggested in the text. one concern one may have with letting sovereigns opt out of the SDRM with 
harsher provisions is that, as belpful as these opt-outs are in giving the sovereign credibility up front, they may 
also in some circumstances lead to inefficient restructuring procedures should the sovereign end up in financial 
distress. If that is the case, it may be desirable at that point to go beck on the opt-<)Ut clauses. Of course. if 
investors anticipate that when push comes to shove these harsher provisions will not be enforced,. there -will be 
no point in letting sovereigns opt out in the first place. Clearly. a delicate balancing act is required here; which 
conceivably the court could be charged with. It could be required to enforre the geoeral principle that, if the 
circumstances uader which the sovereign is Jed to default ou its debt could be reasonably anticipated by 
investors. then opt-out clauses should be enforced, but if they could not� then the court may allow the 
sovereign (with possibly some minimal support of creditors) to remove the harsher PR?visions or to let debt 
restructuring to tske place under the staadard SDRM. 
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simple capital structure; and this strategy may not scale down the sovereign's 
debt enough to fully resolve its fmancial crisis. 
The IMF's proposed SDRM is an important step forward. Not least of the 
benefits of a sovereign bankruptcy framework is that it would enable the IMF 
to credibly commit not to bail out troubled sovereigns. Rather thau bailouts, 
sovereigns would need to look to the SDRM. Unfortunately, the IMF 
framework is flawed in important respects. Although it would help to solve 
the coordination problems faced by sovereign debtors and their creditors, it 
does not adequately address the issue of creditors' priority. Under current 
conditions, it is very difficult for the parties to create enforceable priorities, a 
dilemma which creates a great deal of uncertainty in sovereign credit markets. 
We have argued that a sovereign bankruptcy framework can and should be 
used to remedy this problem. By adopting a strict first-in-time priority 
scheme, and adhering to absolute priority in the classification and voting 
process, the SDRM could enhance sovereign credit markets ex ante, as well as 
providing a mechanism for resolving sovereign debt crises ex post. 
Our proposal also includes a variety of other significant features, including 
a special but limited priority for interim financing _ that analogizes. to. the 
approach used in railroad receiverships in the United States in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unlike other commentators, who 
propose that a new or existing international body oversee the sovereign 
bankruptcy process, we argue that decisionmaking authority. should be vested 
in the existing bankruptcy or insolvency courts of any jurisdiction where the 
sovereign has issued debt. We also argue that sovereigns should be permitted 
to tailor the bankruptcy framework in many respects. 
No proposal is perfect, of course, and ours could no doubt be improved in 
various ways. But a proposal along these lines would address many of the 
problems that have bedeviled the existing responses to sovereign debt crises. 
Our hope is that this Article will contribute to the current discussions over 
whether a sovereign bankruptcy regime should be put in place and shed light 
on how such a regime should be structured. 
